

SNAPSHOTS  
FROM THE **BORDERS**

## Migration at the borders

Global report  
of the participative investigation on migration  
in 20 border territories in Europe.




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## **The Snapshots from the border 2018 Global Report on the situation of border territories**

**Snapshots From The Borders** is a 3-year project co-funded by the European Union (EuropeAid DEAR budget line), run by 35 partners, border Local Authorities and Civil Society organizations. Snapshots From The Borders aims to improve the critical understanding of European, national and local decision makers and of public opinion about global interdependencies determining migration flows towards European borders, in the perspective of reaching SDGs targets, especially SDG 1, 5, 10 11 and 16. Specifically, the project intends to strengthen a new horizontal, active network among cities directly facing migration flows at EU borders, as a way to promote more effective policy coherence at all levels (European, national, local).

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
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# Preface

This report originates from the research conducted in an EuropeAid, DEAR (Development Education and Awareness Raising) Programme<sup>1</sup> project named “Snapshots from the Borders” (SfB from now). Its main aims are to improve the critical understanding of European, national and local decision makers and public opinion about global interdependencies determining migration flows towards European borders<sup>2</sup>, and to support reaching the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, priorities 1, 5, 10, 11 and 16<sup>3</sup>.

This concise version is an extract of the “full global report”. A more than one-hundred pages long document which is, in turn, a presentation and analysis of the local reports. Indeed, the global report brings together 20 local participatory investigations, from: Traiskirchen (Lower Austria), Strass in Steiermark (Styria) - Austria; Mostar - Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burgas - Bulgaria; Agios Athanasios - Cyprus; Grande-Synthe - France; Thuringia Lander - Germany; Aegean Islands and Rhodes - Greece; Siklósnagyfalu - Hungary; Lampedusa (Sicily), Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Marche Region, Apulia Region - Italy; Marsa - Malta; Constanța - România; Maribor and Črnomelj - Slovenia; Tenerife - Spain; and Sweden.

**Ultimate aim of the partners is to establish a Network of Border Towns, Islands and Regions** able to share experiences and practices and to make its voice heard in EU and international institutions. The project intends to strengthen a new **horizontal, active network**, to promote more effective policy coherence at all levels (European, national, local). This report has a twofold aim: increase the mutual knowledge of members engaged in the creation of a **Border Towns Network** and provide information to improve awareness and provide a tool of fact-based information.

The “SfB” participatory investigation process highlights migration experiences at the level of local communities. This **Global Report gathered together the local reports developed by partners**: these are different municipalities, regions, provinces and cities in the front-line of migrants reception. Relevant NGOs, Research Institutes and Foundations complete the partnership. Partners addressed several issues confronting migrants in their territories. On the other side they also explored issues related to the impact of immigration on local communities.

The following analysis presents **results from partners’ investigation, where members have designed and conducted their own participatory investigation**. Partners were free to identify the main issues shaping immigration experiences locally; the methods of data collection were also a matter of local investigation strategy. In order to guide the process leading to the development of this global report an **investigation guideline** was designed. The latter was based on the Terms of References of the project (ToR) and cover the areas focus of the analysis: **historical overview; political and social impact of immigration; local networks; opportunities and limits of local actions; public opinion; integration issues**. The guidelines provided a better understanding of the information needed to develop the local reports as the dimensions explored are complex ones. In this sense the local investigations also help partners to reflect, and appropriate themselves of

1 Link to the DEAR program website: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/dear>

2 See the website of the project: [www.snapshotsfromtheborders.eu](http://www.snapshotsfromtheborders.eu)

3 A comprehensive description of the SDGs: [www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org](http://www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org)

several tools and concepts.

Members explored these issues on their field of investigation and they had a set of criteria to take into consideration (as the obligation to conduct at least 20 interviews with different stakeholders and migrants). Nevertheless, Partners could choose data collection methods, since researchers in charge of the investigation had to choose the best tools for the observation of their field.

The **qualitative participatory approach** was used to develop the local investigations. This approach aims to capture the complexity of a studied phenomenon, as it considers values, attitudes and preferences of participants. Members used methods as workshops, semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and focus groups for data collection. The findings of local reports were shared with participants by workshops. This global report is being developed jointly with LAs and CSAs, the findings and investigation process are constantly shared. This approach allows also the different participants to work together and also serves as a base to the construction and development of the network.

The global report coordination followed **five stages**, under the project's Steering Committee approval and recommendations: **1)** elaboration of an investigation guidelines; **2)** individual follow up of all partners (by Skype meetings); **3)** exchange and work collectively on local reports in webinar (15 October 2018); **4)** present the first results to all partners and work collectively during Vienna meeting (10 - 12 December 2018); **5)** collect partners points of view on the Global Report Draft as a base of improvement (14 - 19 March 2019).

# Introduction

A participatory approach will provide an in-depth understanding on the migrant's population, civil society actors (CSAs) and local authorities (LAs) practices. The investigation design had a particular focus on local dynamics, thus members conducted at least 20 interviews with migrants, CSAs and LAs. It presents the cases and compares information on immigration in territories located in 13 EU Members States (EUMS) and it aims at identifying elements shaping migration experiences on territories.

This report is divided into **two chapters** which provide a unique tale of immigration from the past to the present. From the EU governance to local communities actions. They are an extract and an analysis of local research findings, constructed on the above described Research Guidelines.

**Chapter I** presents a state of the issue at the EU level and explores how the EU governance of immigration is affecting local communities. The report highlights the interdependence between EU, National, local communities in a multilevel governance perspective (section 1). In the section 2 a special attention is paid to the memory of immigration, in exploring the different immigration/emigration past. From historical experiences emerge policy, thus in section 3 the national migration policy dimensions are explored and analyzed. Chapter 4 describes territories and migratory experiences, bringing forth a contextualization of immigration today; territories are being interpreted in local reports as older and new routes, from destination to transit territories.

The **Chapter II** provides information on public opinion and representation of migration where partners identify the main elements shaping public opinion at local level (section 1). A crucial dimension are political speech and policy that are at play in most of members territories. The deconstruction of speeches appears as a need shared by members, followed by the need for contact between citizens and migrants. Section 2 focuses on the role of CSAs and LAs actions: the local reports explain how these different actors are cooperating and facing challenges related to migration. The report presents policies and actors dynamics with a focus on their limits and success. The element identified and shared by members is the increase of CSA responsibilities, and the interdependence of CSA's and LA's. Finally, section 3 focus is on integration issues: partners explored the main local innovative practices and the areas where important improvement is needed. The reports presents the relevant issues related to integration at local level, with a particular focus on actors practices. Information collected by members provided understanding on a variety of "practices". In the Annexes section a table of practices is available. It lists and describes the local practices reported by partner researchers from their fields.











# Chapter I

## 1. From the wider context to local challenges

In the last ten years, immigration to the EU has become a humanitarian issue, placed at the center of a global agenda, with the Marrakesh agreement being the most emblematic response of the international community. From the interest in controlling a specific category of migrants emerge policy, security structures, as well as political speeches, which transform borders and social boundaries. These security apparatus developed at EU and national level produce a particular impact on local communities. The EU borders have been outsourced<sup>4</sup>, but also in-sourced<sup>5</sup> (Hansen & Papademetriou 2014, Mejinvar, 2014), leading to the borders' omnipresence (Leerkes et al. 2013), conducting to hyper-criminalization of migrants and intensifying migrant's socio-economic vulnerabilities (De Giorgi, 2010). In the EU, immigration brings together a range of actors, From EU to local communities, there is a multi-level governance practice. In the reports presented, different dynamics are being experienced, where the immigration features are deeply linked to geographical position of territories. Border territories have been deeply transformed over the EU, in transit and entry areas as preferential "destinations". This re-interpretation of the territories vis-à-vis immigration brings new economic, social and political challenges to local communities.

In 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) showed that 1.000.573 people had reached Europe across the Mediterranean; 84% of them came from the world's top ten refugees producing countries. Thus, most of the people arriving in Europe were fleeing war and persecution<sup>6</sup>. Regarding this picture, EU calls for Members Solidarity, providing a relocation system<sup>7</sup> was pursued as a solution to "relieve" the most affected countries (Greece and Italy, at that time). In some islands the responsibility to rescue and welcome migrants from the sea is a fundamental issue. For **Malta** the Mediterranean Sea is an inescapable factor, so to understand this context correctly, our attention must also be drawn to ships arrivals, search and rescue operations by state actors or civil society organisations and the impact of these arrivals on Maltese society. In early summer 2018 the sea rescue ships Lifeline and Sea-Watch 3 were impounded in Malta's harbour for months because of alleged issues with the vessel's paperwork or registration. While the Lifeline is still impounded, authorities released the Sea-Watch 3 in autumn 2018. **Lampedusa** and **Tenerife** for example are lands of passage for African immigration by sea, using the Sicily Channel or Canary Islands as a gateway to Europe. However, Tenerife has an important immigration from third countries (such as Venezuela). The migration flows towards the **Aegean Sea** and the **Central Mediterranean** are the highest recorded in recent years, according to the UNHCR and

4 For example the EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016.

5 With the enforcement of stricter laws by States, to which the constant distinction between European and non-European migrants follows on.

6 Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html>

7 Council Decisions (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 and 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ 2015 L239/146 and L248/80



the Europe's border control agency (Frontex).

Concerning the dimension of immigration and asylum policies, the Dublin II Regulation<sup>8</sup> is also producing unbalanced impacts on members, since asylum application depends on the country of migrants arrival, thus increasing migratory pressure and responsibility of a couple of countries. The Dublin regulation compromise an effective protection of asylum seekers, in particular because this responsibility is not really shared by all members as it depends more on their geographical location than on their capacity to receive and protect asylum seekers. Over the past four years Greece, which is considered an entry zone to the EU, has seen an unprecedented number of migrants landing on its coasts. Greece, because of its geographic position, bears much of the burden of receiving migrants trying to reach Europe via Turkey and North Africa. The EU-Turkey Agreement (March 2016) produced also an impact on **Rhodes**, thus from 2015 until March 2016 the municipality has provided services to over 27.000 migrants, who stayed in Rhodes for a maximum duration of 23 days. EU accession

gave rise to some improvements in members States: for **Romania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta** it brought about an evolution in migration legislation and policies since they needed to meet the Union standards. Their entry also attracted a new immigration flows from both EU and third countries. **Slovenia** adopted a Resolution on Migration Policy (2002) which better harmonised migration policy with the European *acquis* and basic European principles such as solidarity, freedom of movement, equality, security and maintaining peace, and enforced the Common European Asylum System. Exemplary protection was limited by introducing the International Protection Act in 2016. The New Act narrows the admissibility of the asylum applications<sup>9</sup> and introduces the concept of safe countries of origin<sup>10</sup>. As in **Slovenia, Romania's** asylum policy is also being harmonized as it follows the Community *Acquis*.

In 2015, **France** committed to accept the relocation of 19,714 asylum seekers in 2 years. In 2017, only 4278 of them were relocated in **France** (330 from Italy and 3948 from Greece)<sup>11</sup>. Poland and **Hungary** both refused

8 This assigns responsibility for the asylum process to the state of first arrival in the EU.

9 Article 26 of the International Protection Act empowers the police to deal with foreigners who illegally enter or illegally reside in the Republic of Slovenia before the start of a regular asylum procedure, although they express their intention to ask for asylum. This procedure of the police with foreigners does not constitute decision-making in the asylum procedure.

10 The concept of safe country of origin can lead to violations of refugee law (principle of non refoulement) as the refugee is not only a person who fled before the war, but everyone who is persecuted in his own country because of his personal circumstances (for example, ethnicity, sexual orientation, political opinion, etc.) and his own state cannot or does not want to protect him. No country can generally be designated as "safe country of origin", since under international law, any procedure for determining the status of a refugee must be based on an individual assessment of his circumstances and possible persecution.

11 EU Commission report, available at:

[https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en)

to accept a single asylum-seeker, Spain has fulfilled just 13.7% of its quota, while Belgium has reached 25.6%. **Malta** is the only EU country that has fulfilled its quota<sup>12</sup>. Thus, two years later, this policy showed its inefficiency, because the EU proposed a policy based on a kind of “humanitarian solidarity”<sup>13</sup>, which cannot be compulsory being essentially rooted on sensitivity and voluntary initiatives. This trend is observed in the investigated territories, where it is reported the increasingly important engagement of NGOs, and CSAs in the management of immigration at European level (as in rescue operations) and at the local level, in a variety of areas such as reception and integration.

SfB’ local investigation allowed a better understanding of local contexts. In **Marche** region, the dimension of migration is far from the emergency figures described by Italian media and television. The flows are decreasing in the last few years, and the migrant presence is mainly long-term and quite integrated, migrants are coming from East Europe, China and Maghreb. Migrants presence is proactive in terms of economic contribution to the regional GDP, even if employed mainly in low-profile roles or self-employed, and the percentage of students with migrant background is increasing (second generation). As in the whole country, also a small and quiet region like the Marche has been facing an increase of racism and xenophobic episodes in the last 2 years; facing this must be considered a priority for all those actors, in the private and public sectors, which deal with information, education and equality in access to the services.

As Marche region, **North Aegean Islands** have been facing an increase of racism and xenophobic episodes, mainly after the EU-Turkey Agreement (18 March 2016), due to the long-term stay of refugees and migrants on the islands. There is an urgent need to develop new policies that would relief the refugees pressures on the islands. Due to lack of capacity, financial and structural means the Greek Islands are unable to handle the refugee flows. Despite the efforts, the situation is increasingly getting worse and the region is affected with long-term consequences. In **Rhodes**, a better awareness raising on the activities that local authorities perform as well as the funding opportunities from the European Union with regard to the migration phenomenon would be needed; a closer communication and collaboration between civil society organizations seems to be necessary in order to avoid duplication of effort; a strong coordination from the municipal and local authorities to support refugees and migrants in their integration to the Greek society is necessary. There is no horizontal mainstreaming of integration issues and priorities across the various municipal policies. During the investigation of the context of **Lampedusa**, was possible to identify a very high level of awareness, among local community leaders, of the wider interdependencies that causes the migration phenomenon and its impact on the island.

The context of **Tenerife** is characterized by a very heterogeneous immigration, especially of European and Latin American origin. In general, the attitudes of the population towards immigration are positive, mainly due

<sup>12</sup> For more information see: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/eu-countries-have-fulfilled-less-than-a-third-of-their-asylum-relocation-promises/>

<sup>13</sup> See Marie-Claude Blais (2008), and her concept of “humanitarian solidarity”, available at: <https://www.cairn.info/revue-le-telemaque-2008-1-page-9.htm>







to the migratory past of the Canaries and the intense participative work of numerous social organizations and institutional support of the *Cabildo de Tenerife*. The 'refugee crisis' of 2015 has not had a significant social impact on the island, but has reactivated various social initiatives aimed at raising awareness and defending the rights of migrants. **Bulgaria** is seen by the migrants as a transit country on their route to Western and Northern Europe. As Tenerife, the people in Bulgaria are tolerant and sympathetic to migrants but the politicians and the media are presenting them as a danger and threat to the society and the country. The CSOs are the most active actor in the field of integration of refugees. In **South Tyrol** (Bolzano, Italy) Asylum seekers' accommodation is suboptimal, it can still be improved. Lately the number of arrivals has decreased as the national legal framework deteriorated. Currently about 1.300 asylum seekers are hosted in South Tyrol. In the meanwhile regular immigration is on the path to stabilisation (9,1 percent of population). As a future trend a slow and steady growth of foreign nationals employed in South Tyrol can be expected, as a result of a dynamic development of the region's economy. There is growing numbers of immigrants with Italian citizenship. Further efforts in integration policy is required, but since 2011 there is a growing number of good practices concerning the integration of migrant families. Both the Autonomous province and municipalities have to launch new initiatives, in cooperation with migrants' associations and local NGOs. In **Ayios Athanasios**, there is a need of communication, a campaign raising awareness about the need of active integration of both immigrants and asylum seekers into the local society is increasingly necessary. As there is the need to re-design the national immigration

policy taking into account the views of local authorities. The living conditions of the majority of asylum seekers deteriorated due to a housing crisis and policies have not yet been updated. Another need is to set up horizontal policies for the integration into local societies for migrants staying for longer periods. The lack of proper reception and integration for migrants and asylum seekers is also a main issue in **Marsa**, which pushes the challenges into local communities. Campaigning can be an opportunity to highlight community-based solutions and existing positive interactions, creating a more positive identity for Marsa. The lack of planning from central government needs to be addressed also through advocacy actions from local councils. In the context of **Grande-Synthe** there is a logic of informal camps more established since 2015, and citizens solidarity becomes part of the irregular immigration market. From August to December 2018 more than 1000 migrants passed or stayed at **Grande-Synthe** camps. There is the specificity of the "transit" context: high dependence on solidarity actors at the local level increased the precariousness of the migrants' population, since State institutions are not able to deal with the "camps logic", and the municipality has no resources to provide better reception conditions.

In **Traiskirchen and Strass**, the number of asylum applications has fallen dramatically since 2015. Nevertheless, threatening scenarios are still used in political rhetoric, for example to justify social-expenditure cuts. There is still a long way to fact-based politics in Austria. Volunteers and communities have been involved in caring for refugees since 2015. As in South Tyrol, CSOs actions make a significant contribution to the integration of families. Political support and recognition for this valuable and important

work is lacking, which is problematic for both communities and volunteers. Accommodation of asylum seekers and recognized refugees remains problematic. Contractually specified standards are not met by private providers. As in the case of Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia, migration is a highly politicized issue. In Austrian politics asylum seekers are being used as scapegoats.

In **Sweden**, in 2015 there was an emergence of positive attitudes towards migrants and refugees. After the influx of 163,000 migrants in half a year the political attitudes changed and Sweden took a much more restrictive view - both in receiving, in repatriation and in approving only temporary stay. It is clear - from the highest political level to public officials at the local level - that here is awareness that **Sweden** would not, and could not manage the challenges of migration without the massive support of civil society. There are challenges in the public opinion's view of migrants, but it is more a political crisis than anything else. Recent surveys show that 62% of the population are positive towards refugees/migrants. In **Thuringia**, Districts that have developed an integration concept or integration plan before 2015 could deal well with the increasing number of migrants. Especially in rural areas with a little encounter between locals and migrants, many citizens have reservations about migrants. Good communication between authorities, associations, and citizens is important to improve collaboration and to avoid xenophobia and racism.

Immigration control is affecting the Territory of **Siklónagyfalu (Hungary)**, that is experiencing the physical and legislative

border closure. Considering Serbia a safe third country made it impossible for asylum seekers to enter Hungary legally. Integration support was terminated in 2016, camps were closed, authorities reject applications without a fair evaluation process. Xenophobia is traditionally high in Hungary. The government fear-mongering campaign is fueling anti-migrants sentiments thus creating a hostile atmosphere towards migrants. **Hungary** has always been a transit, not a destination country for asylum seekers and migrants; no previous experience with other ethnic groups (except for Roma) causes fear towards them. Important improvements regarding integration issues need to be done in the **territories of Črnomelj and Maribor (Slovenia)**. The State should assume a more proactive role in the integration of migrants into society and actively involve local communities in these processes (migrant info points/migrant officers): supplement of education system from kindergartens to universities with topics of global education/multiculturalism (priority to education of educators, migrant/multicultural mediators); introduction of a special integration period (e.g. 3-6 months) that will intensify the learning of **Slovenian** language and basic cultural characteristic of local environment for migrant children.

Immigration to **Romania** is a rather recent phenomenon<sup>14</sup> as Romania remains a net emigration country<sup>15</sup>. The numbers of registered asylum applications reach an average of 2,000 applications each year (only in 2017, they raised to 4,820). Nevertheless, Romania is mainly a transit than a destination country for immigrants. Since 2013, **Constanța** faced a new type of migra-

<sup>14</sup> Representing 0.6% of total population.

<sup>15</sup> More than 3,5 million Romanians have left the country to work abroad.

tory flow coming by the Black Sea from Turkey. This migration route is atypical: in 2017, a total number of 537 migrants from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Syria and Afghanistan have been registered in a three months period; in the previous year, there was no case of migration by sea and also no case in 2018. As regards the public opinion and the management of immigration and integration of migrants at local level, the research showed that relevant local stakeholders (LAs, NGOs, social partners and local community) get involved in solving the migration situations and reported welcoming attitude towards migrants in general. Thus, as in the case of **Tenerife**, in **Constanța** there are some examples of positive citizens attitudes. However, in both cases immigration arriving by sea (irregularly) is not an important phenomenon.







## 2. Immigration and Emigration history and memories

Emigration and immigration are embedded in European history. As migration is a social phenomenon, migratory patterns change over time and are shaped by several factors. Emigration is a core element of **Italian** history, in a variety of destinations, intensity, prevalent emigration areas, it has been constantly ongoing, having a crucial impact on the home-country culture and development. **Italians** have, with very limited exceptions, always been economic migrants. They established abroad creating migrants networks which facilitated the mobility of the **Italians** over the time. They were more or less accepted in hosting societies, as the Italians who emigrated to the US between 1921-1930. When 250.000 **Italians** joined their countrymen later on they arrived in an America which no longer welcomed them as was in the past. However, Italian regions experienced different migrations lows in different periods. The little island of **Lampedusa** is an EU entry zone since the 1990s, but it is an island of landing and transit par excellence, itself grown out of the immigration flows it received all along its history: since the '80s the island become the destination of little, but steady, immigration flows, mainly coming from Tunisia. In 1998 the first-identification detention centre has been built in **Lampedusa**. In 2003, 8800 migrants reached **Lampedusa**<sup>16</sup>, and over time the continuous immigration flow, placed the island definitely on a main migratory route. **Bolzano Autonomous Province**, especially in the last century, has had an important period of emigration (until 1990) when the migration balance turned positive as a consequence of EU enlargements (1995, 2004 and 2007). There is still a remarkable share of South Tyrolean highly qualified migrants living abroad, and they keep growing in number. **Marche** is a region of emigration, this trend having become substantial after 1880. Estimates show that between 1876 and 1965 there were about 660,000 expatriates (mainly towards Latin America and the United States). During the two World Wars until the 70s **Marche** citizens emigrated mainly to France, Switzerland, Germany, Austria and Belgium. However **Marche** has a relatively recent experience on immigration, which requires a new local policy elaboration. The history of immigration to **Puglia** is factually and symbolically linked to the first large flows of migrants who arrived in Italy from Albania. During the 20th century **Puglia** was a region with levels of emigration higher than the Italian average. **Puglia citizens** emigrate to Argentina, United States, Brazil, and Venezuela as well as in Europe, to Germany, Switzerland, France and Belgium.

In **Malta** emigration became popular in the beginning of the 19th century, reaching its peak

16 WHO Regional Office for Europe mission of 28–29 March 2011, Increased influx of migrants in Lampedusa, Italy. Available at: [http://www.euro.who.int/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0004/182137/e96761.pdf?ua=1](http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/182137/e96761.pdf?ua=1)



after the Second World War. It was a solution to **Malta's** challenges regarding overpopulation and unemployment following World War II devastation which gave impetus to the first development of a policy to encourage the **Malta** diaspora. Political and economic instabilities (also in neighbouring countries) are connected with population displacement (immigration and emigration) in **Malta** as in **Greece**.

In **Greece**, since the 20th century, immigration is limited mainly to internal and forced displacement from the Balkans and to refugees from Asia Minor and from Egypt (mainly those of Greek origin). The relative economic underdevelopment of the country has led Greeks to emigrate (to Germany, Belgium, the USA and Australia among others). After the geopolitical changes of 1989, **Greece** became a host country of undocumented immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and from the underdeveloped countries.

**Tenerife** has been, historically, a land of emigration (especially towards the Americas) and of immigration (from Europe and, in the last three decades, from America and Africa). In the meantime, **Tenerife** is considered as an island of passage (immigration by sea), where the Canary Islands are a gateway to Europe (this immigration flow is not anymore relevant today). However immigration from Latin America, is still very important, what contributes to the island cultural diversity.

**Cyprus** had diverse experiences on immigration. These are linked to its colonial past (until 1954 it was a British colony), and the occupation of a part of the territory by Turkey (in 1974) has created extensive numbers of dispossessed people who are both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. The shifting historical background helps to describe a

cultural identity of the Cypriot people that has been influenced by different populations and civilizations, which have determined the evolution of the country economically, culturally and socially.

In **Slovenia** emigration in the 19th was linked to wars, but the industrialisation stabilised the Slovenian emigration, and also attracted migrants who played an important role in the development of the country. However, migrants were mainly intra-European. The history of **Maribor** and **Črnomelj** is embedded in the different stages of immigration that contributed to identity construction. Through the centuries migrant groups have participated in local development, or in defense of the territory, they contributed to ethnic diversity.

With more than 17% of its population outside its borders, **Romania** ranks among the European Union countries with the highest share of emigrants: there is an important **Romanian** diaspora in Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK. The Balkans political instability was a vector of forced displacement of **Bulgarian** population as wars generated the biggest wave of refugees (350.000 refugees). After WWII thousands of **Bulgarians** moved from the Bulgarian kingdom. On the other hand **Bulgaria** also received Armenians refugees (in 1896), thousands of Russians fled to Bulgaria after WWI, and in the same period also political immigrants from Greece settled in **Bulgaria**.

**BiH's** emigration is characterised by voluntary, economically driven migration and forced migration during and after the war of 1992–1995. The most significant migration flows have occurred in the last two decades, as a result of the 1992–1995 war, involving the displacement of 2 million people. Forced migration both within the country and

abroad significantly changed its demographic structure. The second wave of migration after the conflict involved the massive numbers of returning refugees from abroad (repatriation) and significant numbers of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs). **BiH** refugees emigrated from their host countries to third countries (USA, Canada and Australia). The 2000 has been characterised by voluntary migration (predominantly labor driven), to neighbouring countries as Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro. Since 2000, an average 15,000 to 20,000 **BiH** citizens have emigrated every year to the EU. In terms of internal migration, economically driven rural-urban migration amounts to less than 1% of the country's population a year<sup>17</sup>.

In **Sweden**, starting with the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, 1,3 million people emigrated to the USA, Canada, South America and Australia. The main reason behind this were poverty, religious persecution, lack of political freedom. During the 1950s the great influx of refugees from the war, and numerous workers arrived (most of them remained), and in the 70s the "regulated immigration" was implemented as a way to control immigration. The allowance to stay for migrants workers was handled by the national employment authorities.

**Hungary's** experiences in immigration/emigration are rather limited, lacking both colonial historical experiences and immigration of different ethnic groups in large numbers. Possibly as a consequence, immigration is approached racially, making xenophobia

relatively high in **Hungarian** society. The oldest migration experience for **Hungarian** society is the mass emigration event following **Hungary's** unsuccessful uprising against the Soviet occupation in 1956 and still plays a central role in **Hungarian** national sentiment. **Hungary** was not a destination country for migrants and refugees. However, because of its location on the fastest route from the Balkans toward Western and Northern Europe, the country has played an important role in migration as a transit country.

**Austria** was in the past a destination country for refugees, because of European conflicts (as the "Prague Spring"), today it is also a destination for refugees. Flows are essentially from non-EU countries, what makes crucial reception and integration issues. The laws regarding admission of migrants and refugees are also stricter since 2002. **Austria, Germany and France<sup>18</sup>**, have some similarities regarding their experiences on immigration: for these countries the migrants workers recruitment was a determinant element of industrial growth. It still remains closely linked to competitiveness and development. On the other hand, the recognition of the permanent character of such immigration has led countries such as **France** and **Austria** to adopt a more restrictive immigration policy after the end of migrant workers stage.

However, immigration and emigration are part of the European memory, they are also embedded in the construction of the European Union and the establishment of the Schengen Area. Emigration

<sup>17</sup> According to official data of the statistical agencies the **BiH** diaspora is at least 2 million people, thus 56.6% compared to 3,531,159 of the total population in **BiH**.

<sup>18</sup> Some examples of migrant recruitment agreements: The Franco-Spanish agreement of 1961, the Franco-Portuguese agreement of 1963, the 1963 agreement allowed the development of Moroccan immigration



has been recognized in the past as an opportunity by countries as **Italy** or **Romania**, or as a response to political and economic instability, as in **Greece**, **Bulgaria** and **Malta**, which has given rise to diasporas of populations in all parts of the globe. These countries population had the possibility to develop immigration networks, but an effort regarding diaspora policy needs to be considered. Immigration (both from Europe and third countries) in the past has also contributed to the cultural diversity that is experienced in everyday life. The experiences shared by European countries, their society and smaller communities, can help to better understand today's immigration to the EU. Often

the motivations for immigration seem similar to those that led to emigration and displacement of European populations in the recent past, when emigration was seen as a solution to mitigate social, economic and political inequalities and as a way of surviving in contexts of war and turmoil.



### 3. Migration policies

Immigration policies are divided into two parts: immigration control policy (regulation, rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreigners), and the selection and control of permanent immigrants as workers and refugees, but also the control of irregular migration; and reception policies that correspond to the reception conditions that the State makes available to immigrants. Migration policy is highly dependent on state position on migrants categories and regarding State-specific needs; it tends to change over time and to be more restrictive or more “open” on the base of a State needs.

As for the **Romanian** policy, it aims at attracting highly qualified immigration. **Romania** National Strategy on Immigration for the period 2015-2018 stipulates the management of immigration including: addressing specific skills gaps and attracting highly qualified workers, a robust approach to illegal immigration and readmission (including a better cooperation with third countries), and protection through asylum policy. However **Romania** priority remains immigration control. Similar is the case of **BiH**, where the Law on Border Control stipulates that the Border Service has the obligation of “ensuring the inviolability of the state border, protecting life and health (...) preventing illegal cross-border migration”<sup>19</sup>. To exercise the right to asylum a foreigner has to submit a request to apply for asylum at one of the border crossings<sup>20</sup>. **Bosnia and Herzegovina** migration policy is characterized by the absence of a coherent and comprehensive national strategy that incorporates social inclusion. This framework should include extensive human-rights oriented reforms that adequately target social welfare and inclusion. The adoption and full implementation of such a strategy would facilitate inclusive socio-economic growth in the country. Institutions and policies targeting migrants should be developed, with a focus on realizing the development potential of diaspora communities, and provide incentives for highly skilled **Bosnia and Herzegovina** citizens to return. Cooperation policies with EU and other destinations are also necessary in order to promote legal and circular migration, improve the social welfare of migrants and the transferability of social benefits<sup>21</sup>.

Between 1958 and 1974 in **France**, as in **Germany** and **Austria**, a rapid industrialization required additional labor; the call for “immigrant workers” was necessary. In **France** bilateral agreements have been signed<sup>22</sup>. This period is marked by European immigration, followed by a period of absence of immigration policies with the recognition of the permanent character of this immigration (Sayad, 1999). This is also linked deindustrialization, and it is reflected in increasingly restrictive laws. The Collomb law of 10 September 1974 “for a controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum

19 Article 2. paragraph 1 points: a, b, c, d, e. The Law on Border Service of BiH

20 Article 31 of the Law on Asylum: -Border Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the border crossing or -organization units of the Service for Foreigners Affairs.

21 Kačapor-Džihic Z and Oruč N (2012): Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, Final Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina: Executive Summary 2. European Commission, 3, <https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=8840&langId=en>

22 The Franco-Spanish agreement of 1961, the Franco-Portuguese agreement of 1963, the agreement of 1963 allowed the development of the Moroccan immigration

and successful integration" is a law aimed at reforming the Ceseda<sup>23</sup> and it has given rise to concerns because of the strict time limits of the asylum procedure. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe has argued that the proposal to reduce the deadline for submitting asylum applications to 90 days, considering the obstacles faced by asylum seekers when they arrive in the country, may be difficult to meet. It also considers that under the accelerated procedure, after the expiry of the proposed deadline, the vulnerability of asylum seekers and the complexity of their cases are not taken into account. In **France**, the Republican system (of immigration and integration) groups a series of structures capable of receiving, welcoming and assisting asylum seekers (guaranteeing access to education, health, justice etc.). However, this system does not consider migrants who do not apply for asylum or who had the asylum application rejected, as is the case with migrants living in camps in **Grande-Synthe**. These migrants are known as 'in transit', living in camps to try to cross the border. The majority of them did not apply for asylum or had their application rejected. A small part of migrants who go to the camps are also in the asylum procedure. Despite the system of reception and integration, migrants are living in camps because this space is perceived as a step in their migratory route, where the final destination is the UK. It is possible to observe the state efforts to eliminate this kind of immigration, with restrictive policies and the destruction of camps, while the city and civil society actors develop local practices to support this population.

**Germany** has adapted over time its

migration policies in relation to economic and social needs. The new immigration law (2018) represent a kind of "open door" for skilled migrants needed by **Germany**. Therefore, to keep migrants they must be integrated into the society. In **Thuringia** some innovations in this sense can be reported in relation to the "integration concept", which is focused on: intercultural openness, welcome and recognition of culture, abatement of exclusion, discrimination, racism and group-focused enmity, language, education, employment and the labor market, health and human rights-oriented refugee and integration policies.

In **Austria** policies concerning the reception of asylum seekers became an important issue. In principle, the Provincial Councillor is in charge of the relocation of refugees, regardless of their age. The Lower Austrian Basic Provision Act (Traiskirchen municipality is in this jurisdiction) stipulates that there is no entitlement to an individual or specific accommodation. In answer to a parliamentary inquiry, the Provincial Councillor stated that the state is free, at any time and without stating the reasons, to relocate unaccompanied minors. In a state government meeting, the constitutional service made it clear that the coordination of unaccompanied minor refugees falls under the responsibility of the Provincial Councillor and not under those children and youth services where they was once hosted. However, **Austria** is not a traditional country of immigration and immigration policies reflect this ambivalence: its accession to EU produced a more "open border" policy, but asylum policy became, since the '90s, more and more restrictive<sup>24</sup>.

23 Code of entry and residence of foreigners and asylum

24 Information available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/austria-country-immigration>









In **Spain** migration policy has been characterized, especially during the years before the last production and labor crisis (2008), by a functionalist approach focused on labor and a certain degree of flexibility in terms of illegal immigration. Spanish migration control is handled by the State, while policies for integration have been developed mainly at the local level, where the Autonomous Communities and municipal bodies are the central actors (Alonso, 2011). Migration policy from 2000 to 2008 was characterized by opening the door to illegal entries in a context of increased need of unskilled labor. It was a policy focused on fighting (partly) against illegal immigration and regulating the job market. It turned, on different occasions, to extraordinary regularization and normalization of foreigners' situations (similarly to what happened in Italy in the same period), reflecting the paradox of a policy that was formally restrictive but, in practice, permissive (Godenau, 2010). This contributed, along with the expansion of the underground economy, to an increase in illegal immigration (López-Sala, 2013). Starting with year 2008 the restrictive and securitization approach prevailed (Izquierdo, 2008).

The public attitude and governmental behaviour in **Hungary** regarding migration leave very little space for positive action. Because of the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis, a country that had never been a targeted by migration flows went through a comprehensive transformation based on a make-up fight against mass-migration until 2018: the complete legal framework of refugee protection was deeply damaged, and the number of asylum-seekers accepted into **Hungary** was dramatically reduced. **Hungarian**

policies are mainly focused on border security. In **Hungary** the border is concretely closed. The government also declared crossing the border fence a criminal act. Between September 2015 and September 2016, 2,894 people were brought to court for "illegal border crossing". Closing reception centres and facilities are going hand in hand with a more strict border control and stricter legislation, what implies even the displacement of refugees from urban areas to rural areas.

Policy is also intertwined with the **EU integration process**. In some cases the accession to the EU has produced considerable progress in immigration and asylum policies, like in **Cyprus, Malta, Romania** and **Slovenia**. In the latter case, its policy was harmonised with the European acquis and respects basic European principles such as solidarity, human rights, freedom of movement, equality and security. **Slovenia** adopted in 1999 the Resolution on Immigration Policy of the Republic of Slovenia<sup>25</sup> which defined three main pillars of immigration policy in Slovenia: the protection and assistance of refugees and asylum seekers, integration of migrants into Slovenian society and prevention of illegal migration. The Resolution also provided the normative and organisational structure necessary for a successful and consistent implementation of immigration policy. For **Cyprus** the EU accession resulted also in a wave of anti-discrimination policies, which look to play a crucial role and resulting in the adoption of a broad legislative framework and protection against discrimination. It was observed an important impact concerning international protection which is standardized and in line with EU standards. However, also because

25 See Official Gazette RS no. 40/99



these countries developed migration policy later, several areas are still reported to be problematic. It is even more dramatic in border territories where a relatively “new” policy framework is confronted with (in some cases) the arrival of large flows of asylum seekers.

In **Italy** only in the 1990s a migration policy regarding management and conditions of migrants started to be developed. From late 1990s to 2011 it was focused on limiting immigration, by the establishment of a working permit procedures and yearly immigration quotas per country of origin. In 2002 Italy started to securitize immigration, focusing much on internal security and external border control. **Integration policy** started to be discussed in 2009 focused on the integration of families in the Italian society. However the reception and relocation of asylum seekers in **Italy** involves several structures, as centres and facilities coordinated at local, national and EU levels (as Hotspots, regional centres, SPRAR-system, etc.). The SPRAR system is going to be ruled out substituted by the new SIPROIMI<sup>26</sup>, in a context where a securitization approach is prevailing and a new law on national security has introduced more restrictive rules for international protection and immigration<sup>27</sup>. 2017's Italy-Libya Agreement formalized a policy of externalization of border controls and patrolling, aimed at drastically reducing migrants landings.

Migration and integration laws in **Sweden** are newer than in Italy. Since 2001 **Sweden** became part of the Schengen area. A temporary law was passed in 2005 in which undocumented people who had not left the country were given a second chance to receive permission to stay. **Sweden** shows a level of flexibility regarding irregular migrants (in 2005 law). However, migrants and refugees “access to rights” is a new issue (as in Bulgaria, and Romania). Since the beginning of the 2000 an increasing difficulty of people arriving without established identity or travel documents is reported; it makes the asylum process more complex and time consuming. As an to increasing number of people was not granted asylum, this became a problem as they became undocumented and could not be forced to return to another country. In 2010 some changes were introduced granting asylum seekers more chances to work and attend university. At almost the same time both migrants and undocumented people were granted the right to subsidised healthcare. In 2013 all people coming from Syria were granted permanent right to stay.

Regarding the right of asylum in **Bulgaria** legislative tools are being elaborated since 2002 and are being subjected to several changes over time. Bulgarian legislation provides a number of possibilities for the integration and social inclusion of refugees and migrants who

<sup>26</sup> Sistema di protezione per titolari di protezione internazionale e per minori stranieri non accompagnati. With the implementation it will be possible to assess the effectiveness of SIPROIMI program and to compare it with the SPRAR. In any case it appears that it will have a restrictive effect in terms of access to integration programs, since asylum seekers are not eligible. Currently 72% of SPRAR beneficiaries are eligible as asylum seekers or people under international protection.

<sup>27</sup> DECRETO-LEGGE 4 ottobre 2018, n. 113. Disposizioni urgenti in materia di protezione internazionale e immigrazione, sicurezza pubblica (Law Decree - urgent regulations on international protection and immigration, public order).

have been granted protection<sup>28</sup>. These rights are not easily exercised. The major reason for that is the politics of the different political parties which are keen to play with the fears of the society. Another evidence of the political class reluctance to implement an effective integration politics towards the migrants is the fact that the National plan for asylum, migration and integration which is supposed to follow the corresponding National strategy is not in place yet.

The **Greek** policy takes into account EU legislation and reports, as well as UNHCR's, and even if municipalities do not have competencies on integration and immigration policies, they strongly shape the local environment promoting or, conversely, undermining the prospects of integration. When the "Kallikratis" reform was launched (2010), the involvement of municipalities in integration-related policies has grown as their competences has. It was given institutional form with the establishment of Migrant Integration Councils (MICs) in every municipality. In **Greece**, as well as in **Italy**, migration reception conditions depends on several structures and facilities: in **Greece** there are mainly camps, also in the frame of EU policy and with the contribution of a multiplicity of local and international actors (as NGOs or OI's).

Considering the governance of immigration at the local level, it is possible to observe a certain degree of autonomy being transferred from the national to the local sphere. As the Migrant Integration Councils (MICs) gave more autonomy to municipalities in **Greece**. **Romanian** policy is developed also at the regional level but is still centralized by a General Inspectorate. In

Romania, more known as an emigration country, since 2017 this trend has changed as Romania has attracted migrant workers and a considerable increase in the number of work permits quotas has been promoted by the government. Harmonization with the Community Acquis also boosted migration policies. With **Romania** this has resulted in a modernization of asylum policies and a focus on combating irregular immigration. In order to supplement social assistance, including houses for refugees, GII cooperates, based on protocols with non-governmental and international organizations. Activities related to integration, are provided also by the Regional Integration Centers with NGOs which operate in several cities. These regional integration centers are funded through AMIF - Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, and they are designed to provide social counseling, information, collaboration with local authorities, accompanying services, language courses and other support.

28 Among others: right to free preschool and school education in public schools and universities; right of additional Bulgarian language classes; right to recognition of their university degree diploma acquired abroad; right to free access to the labor market; right of access to medical services.







## 4. The borders and migratory experience: Islands, new and old destinations, transit zones

In the territories the context of immigration experiences is largely determined by the migrant category (i.e. asylum seekers don't engage the issues as migrant students) which influences the policies implementation and the mobilization of specific actors due to their capitals<sup>29</sup>. The risk implied by the route will also determine the involvement of different actors, oriented by humanitarianism. Issues about the implied risk of migratory routes are thus more present in islands and in coastal cities, as the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea has led to policy drafting (national, European and NGO's rescue missions).

Islands are being redefined, by national and EU policies, as entry and transit zones. This has been seen as the result of EU members States immigration control leading to the intensification of irregular immigration networks, as noted in the case of **Lampedusa**, the **Greek Islands**, **Malta**, **Cyprus** and **Tenerife**. Among these Islands, in **Tenerife** irregular migration by sea is not an important phenomenon nowadays. **Malta** more precisely serves as a transit zone, migrants are transferred quickly to other locations (eventually to Lampedusa). **Lampedusa** has been on the migration route since 2003 at least, and is still one of the main EU gateways. Both **Malta** and **Tenerife** were not affected by 2015 immigration flow; the important flows were in 2013 for **Malta** and 2008 for **Tenerife**.

So far, in 2018, a total of 19,459 refugees and migrants arrived in **Greece** by sea (similarly to the past years). From 2015 until the EU-Turkey Agreement (March 2016), approximately 800.000 refugees arrived in the **North Aegean Islands**<sup>30</sup>. **Greece** is not considered a destination country, but an **in-between** stop zone in the journey to the more developed EU countries. Mostly Germany but also Sweden and Denmark, where they seek better living conditions, safety and more integration opportunities. The majority of migrants do not want to stay in Greece due to harsh living conditions, high unemployment rates (even among the locals) and unprosperous economy. In **Rhodes** until the EU-Turkey Agreement (from 2015 until March 2016), the municipality has provided services to over 27.000 migrants, who stayed in Rhodes for a maximum duration of 23 days. The overpopulation in **Greek island** leads to migrants vulnerability. Due to the limited capacity of receiving new arrivals, most of the asylum seekers do not benefit of the reception services according to the law. Migrants are being held in identification centers or police stations. These locations are, frequently, overpopulated and do not meet the necessary requirements; there is often no separation between women, children and men. There is no infrastructure to apply for asylum or detect and treat special needs of asylum seekers. The immediate problem arising from migrants flows is the extremely high cost of managing them.

29 Migrants capitals have a determinant role on migration. As social networks are recognised as a key source of migrants capitals, facilitating migration and settlement, ethnic networks can also create communities of resistance (D'Angelo, 2015). Demographic and clinical characteristics of refugees seeking primary healthcare services in Greece in the period 2015–2016: a descriptive study E Kakalou E Riza M Chalikiaris N Voudouri A Vetsika C Tsiamis S Choursoglou A Terzidis E Karamagioli T Antypas .E Pikoulis, International Health, Volume 10, Issue 6, November 2018, Pages 421–429, <https://doi.org/10.1093/inthealth/ihy042>

30 The number of 16,536, about 85% of total arrivals in Greece landed on the three biggest islands of the Region of North Aegean: Lesbos (10,275 – 53%), Samos (3,732 – 19%) and Chios (2,529 - 13%).

In **Cyprus** several areas are still considered problematic, mainly because **Cyprus** has not constructed and established a policy framework regarding the inclusion of asylum seekers. The legal framework on reception conditions is a combination of various international, EU and national legal instruments<sup>31</sup>. On the reception conditions, applicants do not have sufficient means to ensure their health and subsistence. Asylum-seekers are placed in a Reception Centre, but centres have a limited capacity, and the majority of asylum seekers reside in shared houses<sup>32</sup>. Asylum seekers are living in precarious conditions. Moreover, the lack of fulfilment of asylum seekers' basic needs creates social conditions which cultivate frustration, anger, discrimination and inter-ethnic tensions. Language barriers are also important when considering migrants integration in **Cyprus**. However for the Islands the particular migration (employing very risky methods) puts a question on the responsibility to protect and rescue people in the sea, what implicates several actors interventions. The situation has been altered in the last three years (since late 2015), when numerous migrants landed, having the country as their final destination and not as a point of entrance for other European countries.

Changes are also observed to the nationalities, migration reasons and vulnerability.

**Malta** context could be understood as an entry and transit zone, asylum seekers landed in **Malta** since 2002. Often, as observed in the **Greek islands**, **Malta** is not their destination, migrants try to move on to Northern Europe countries, while some remain in the island.

*Increasingly reported since 2015 until nowadays is a sub-category of landings on the southern shores of EU countries: the "ghost landings". Little groups of migrants (usually between 5-15) land at night on the coasts of Sicily and Puglia – among others – aiming at passing unnoticed and proceed in their travel to reach central and north European countries. This can be looked at as a way to avoid the security structures present in more established entry routes.*

31 "Member States shall ensure they provide an adequate standard of living for applicants, (...) which guarantees asylum seekers subsistence and protects their physical and mental health" (Article 17(2)1), Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers, available online at: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:031:0018:0025:EN:PDF>

32 The maximum amount accorded to asylum-seekers is €735 for a family of 4 or more members; for an individual it €320. The rental allowance is €100 for single people and couples, and €150 for a family of three and can reach up to a maximum of €200 for families of four and above. An additional amount is paid in vouchers for food and clothing, which can be redeemed at specific shops located in different cities. Finally, a small amount is given in direct payment.

*The Reception and Identification Centres as well as the Open Reception Facilities in the Region of North Aegean are overcrowded since the hosted refugees and migrants overcome the number of their nominal capacity by three times. Over 17.000 people remain crammed in Greek island reception centers with a total capacity for only 6.000, living in desperate conditions which do not meet humanitarian standards. The EU and National policies on migration should take in serious consideration that the carrying capacity of the islands in hosting refugees are limited, and it is not possible to create camps next to small villages where the camp capacity exceeds several times the local population. All infrastructure and local conditions do not have the capability, in spite of the goodwill of local population to host and integrate such huge migration flows.*

However, **Malta** was almost not affected by 2015 so called “crisis”; that year most of the 1,781 people applying for asylum arrived through regular means, whilst only 104 people arrived irregularly by ship. Therefore, when analysing the context of immigration in Malta, the extremely small size of the country and the acutely dense population have to be taken into consideration. Immigrants arrivals posed a question on citizens and migrants (mainly newcomers) coexistence.

What makes the tiny **Lampedusa** island similar to **Malta**, is that they both are entry and transit zones. Anyway, the number of landed immigrants who stay in the island is negligible: Lampedusa is an only entry and transit zone. While the exposition of the southernmost piece of Italian and EU land to contemporary migratory flows is what singles **Lampedusa** out in this context: the island centrality in migration patterns

has put the small territory (20 square kilometers), local community and authorities under strain when exceptional events happened; in the meantime, its over exposition on media turned the island into a symbol of today’s migration phenomenon.

Currently, 177.000 people of foreign origin reside on the Island of **Tenerife**: 19.8% of the population. It is a heterogeneous population (170 different nationalities). The territorial distribution of the immigrant population reflects the importance of the economic circumstances, with their presence being spread around the urban areas and in touristic areas. On irregular migration, it is important to differentiate between illegal border crossings (arrival via the sea in rafts and *cayucos*) and the simple stay in the island irregularly. Those who

cross the border illegally do not necessarily stay, or if they are intercepted, they may be sent to other places by the authorities. As a waypoint in the Atlantic migration route, Canary Islands are the place of arrival for those who embark from the western coast of neighbouring countries. From 2002 to 2008, these arrivals were much more numerous than in prior and later years, reaching a notable peak of 31,678 migrants in 2006. Currently, flows are at a lower level and the reactivation of this route will depend on events in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean routes, which are now relatively more permeable. In 2017, 418 people arrived from the coasts of Africa in 16 watercrafts. For these migrants **Canary Islands** are a land of passage, a first stage on their trip towards EU, France and Germany.

**In the Islands migration experiences**







are different, but in all these cases the islands are part of a migration project. Islands are an entry and transit zone for migrants who wish to reach other EU countries. Migrant workers, and permanent migration are also an important category in the cases of **Malta** and **Tenerife**. The issues related to immigration are not similar in islands: there are different migrants categories identified, as migrants in transit, irregular migrants or immigrants workers, do not pose the same questions related to policy and integration issues; the migrants origins are also an important issue when we consider citizens attitudes. For Greek islands the significant number of migrants represents a major problem, saturating the reception structures and contributing to the increase of the migrants precariousness. Accommodation, access to labor market, and access to society is a main issue in Cyprus. Also Malta is concerned by labor market issues, but a more relevant one is the fight against irregular labor market.

The coastal territories as **Constanța** and **Puglia** are also concerned by international or national NGOs rescue interventions. It is not the case of **Grande-Synthe**, where rescue operation in English Channel are not an important phenomenon. Overall, for **Constanța**, on the Black Sea route, migration phenomenon is still new and did not become a situation giving rise to major concerns or difficulties, because currently it is not a conventional route. The main issue is rather to fight irregular migration and smugglers. In **Puglia**, EU missions and rescue operations (promoted by different actors) are very important issues, even shaping public opinion. In **Constanța** and **Puglia**, as in **Malta** and **Tenerife** migrants workers are also arriving

looking for work opportunities in the tourism industry or other sectors.

Migrants are being considered as “in transit” at national and EU level (in terms of policy elaboration) as observed in: **Rhodes, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Grande-Synthe, Lampedusa, Malta, Hungary, Tenerife, Mostar (BiH) and Constanța**. However this is producing particular effect in **Grande-Synthe**, because **France** is a traditional destination. Instead those arriving in Grande-Synthe are being perceived as migrants who will not remain in the territory, which leads to an intensification of their vulnerability, since they are not object of immigration and integration policies. They depend almost exclusively on citizens, NGOs and municipality support. Migrants in Grande-Synthe are not object of reception and integration policies, what brings to the city the camps phenomenon (more visible since 2015). **Grande-Synthe** is an old migratory route, what is producing camps is the security structure. The difficulty to cross the Channel contributes to the emergence of long-term informal camps, where migrants are living in extreme precariousness, waiting for the opportunity to cross the border. However, with the reinforcement of the security structures, in the tunnel and in Calais to cross the border has become much more difficult after the Touquet agreement (2003). Since November 2018 there are around 1500 migrants<sup>33</sup> living in camps (in tents), in degrading conditions.

The original Balkan migration route, which ran from Turkey, Greece via Macedonia and Serbia to Croatia, was closed in 2016, when people smugglers turned to alternative routes through the region where borders were less closely guarded. Migrants from the Middle East

33 The majority of migrants in Grande-Synthe camps are of Kurdish ethnic origin.



and North Africa are increasingly using the new route from Greece via Albania, Montenegro and BiH to EU member Croatia. In 2015 and 2016 **BiH** received almost no migrants. This changed in 2018 when **BiH** experienced a sharp increase in arrivals coinciding with a related humanitarian crisis in the north-western Canton of Una-Sana (USC), where a significant number of refugees have gathered waiting for the opportunity to cross the Croatian border and enter the EU. The City of **Mostar** is situated in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (**HNC**), in the south-west. Due to its geographical position, in the context of migration, the City of Mostar is not attractive to the vast majority of migrants who generally want to exit **BiH** on the northwest border and move on to the Western Europe countries transiting through Croatia.

In destination countries as **Germany, Austria and Sweden**, after 2015 there is an important increase of asylum applications, thus there is a main concern on reception and social inclusion of asylum seekers. In **Traiskirchen (Lower Austria)** and **Strass in Steiermark (Styria)**, the arrival of these migrants also resulted in temporary camps, but they were transferred to reception centres and structures. The question nowadays is related to the integration of these migrants, on which CSAs and LAs play an important role.

**Hungary** (in 2015 especially), **Slovenia** (after 2015) and **Bulgaria** (in 2014) are contexts in between new transit zones and destinations. The particularity of these territories is that despite the number of entries and asylum

applications, migrants generally go to other EU countries. They are thus being defined as zones of entry and/or transit. In the summer of 2015, 50,000 asylum-seekers from Kosovo crossed the **Hungarian** border and went towards Germany and Western Europe<sup>34</sup>. During this period, the terror attack in Paris occurred and Hungarian Prime Minister gave his first speech in which he drew a connection between refugees and terrorism<sup>35</sup>, which reinforced hostile attitudes towards migrants. In March-April 2015, the number of asylum-seekers began to increase, and by late May/early June, it was higher than ever. The real crisis situation, the so-called breakthrough, happened in July when the number of arriving people exceeded 1,000 per day (Lilla, Menedék's social worker, Budapest 20.08.18). In July-September 2015 the number of asylum-seekers reached 109,175. This experience boosted the securitization approach, evidenced by the anti-immigration speeches and campaign, the complete border closure and the criminalization unauthorized border crossings. **Bulgaria** has become a destination for EU, Russian and Ukrainian migrants, attracted by its tax policies, but it is also gone through as a "transit zone" for migrants who want to reach other EU countries.

The networks of migrants are a factor to consider in **Marche**, where Romania, Albania, Morocco and China are the first four countries of origin and represent about half of the resident foreign population. It is clear how the role of networks is crucial in the choices of localization of immigrants: the phenomena of the so-called

34 These people were later rejected by the German authorities and returned to Kosovo.

35 "While I am PM, Hungary will definitely not become an immigration destination. We don't want to see significantly sized minorities with different cultural characteristics and backgrounds among us. We want to keep Hungary as Hungary." (Rettmann, 2015: 01).

“migratory chains” means that newcomers choose places in which the community of origin is already widely represented<sup>36</sup>. These communities have an important role in supporting newcomers “integration”. A similar trend also observed in **Slovenia**. The latter is considered a destination for people coming from the Balkans and looking for opportunities. However, **Slovenia** faced an important increase of immigration in 2015<sup>37</sup>: about 450.000 migrants crossed Slovenia from 2015 to 2016, (the majority from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Balkan countries). The Slovenian government organised bus and train transport for migrants from Slovenian southern border to northern border. At that time people reacted very positively although some civil initiatives<sup>38</sup> organised protests against migrants and accommodation centres. After the closure of the so-called Balkan route in 2016 (closure of Hungarian borders) a new so called Western Balkan route has opened (from Greece to Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia to Slovenia and further to Western Europe). Today entering the EU is much more difficult compared to 2015<sup>39</sup>, and **Črnomelj** became a new entry zone. From January to September 2018 a total of 6,667 migrants crossed Slovenia border: a

more than 400 % increase compared with the same period in 2017. There is a risk implied on this route as migrants need to cross the border river Kolpa. Similarly to **Hungary**, since 2015 Slovenian government has built more than 200 km of fences on Slovenian-Croatian border.

From 1991 to 2018 the share of foreign nationals residing in the **Autonomous Province of Bolzano** grew from 1,1 percent to 9,5 percent out of a total population of 531.000 (31.12.2018). The bigger part of the labor force with foreign nationality has got an occupation in services, mostly in tourism, in agriculture and in the construction industry. The autonomy of the Province of Bolzano does not embrace powers on immigration control and asylum system. Its powers are mostly restricted to the enhancement and arrangements for migrant families’ integration, such as education, health care, cultural services, housing, social policy and labor market. The territorial autonomy of the Province of Bolzano allows for providing a range of measures and facilities on provincial and local level to enhance the integration into the society indeed. Integration is also an issue in the **Autonomous Province of Bolzano**; as a border region, from 2015 to 2017 it has been affected by an increasing inflow

36 Bettin, G., Dottori D., “Foreign workers in the Marche economy”, Marche Economics Journal of Applied Economics (Vol. XXXV, No. 1, June 2016).

37 Slovenia was one of the transit countries on the Balkan route. A crucial place is Maribor because of its neighbouring position with Austria. Not far from Maribor in the village of Šentilj an exit point for migrants crossing Slovenia to Austria was set-up, which included also accommodation camp for migrants.

38 In several cases the civil initiatives protesting against migrants were supported and/or established by politicians mostly from Slovenian Democratic Party (e.g. protest in Šenčur in 2016 was attended by important members of Parliament from Slovenian and civil initiative against migrant centre in Bela Krajina)

39 Available at: [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WB\\_ARA\\_2018.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WB_ARA_2018.pdf); (retrieved 16th of October 2018) and/or Save the Children in North West Balkans, Balkans Migration and Displacement Hub, Save the Children 2018; [https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/documents/sc\\_bmdh\\_data\\_regional\\_overview\\_april-june\\_2018\\_web.pdf](https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/documents/sc_bmdh_data_regional_overview_april-june_2018_web.pdf)

of asylum seekers. In the second half of 2018 the emergency character of asylum seekers' arrivals has cooled down and issues of long term integration and inclusion are gaining ground and attention.

Due to its geographical position the **Autonomous Province of Bolzano** is not only a destination of migrants seeking job opportunities, but also a transit area for both migrants arrived in Southern Italy seeking to reach Austria, Germany or another Northern European country and asylum seekers – trying to enter Italy from the North or repulsed by Austrian or German authorities. At the end of 2018, 1.500 asylum seekers have been accommodated in facilities located in the Province of Bolzano. For asylum seekers, mostly in 2016 and 2017, the responsible provincial and State authorities have set up various typologies of reception centres (mostly the so called “*Centri di accoglienza straordinaria CAS*”) in order to provide basic and emergency services; but also a considerable number of accommodation facilities for longer periods for asylum seekers awaiting the result of their asylum procedure, the so-called SPRAR (Protection system for asylum seekers and refugees) and, since October 2018, reformed and renamed SIPROIMI (Protection system for holders of international protection status and for unaccompanied foreign minors), run by the local authorities in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior.

Finally, meaningful arrivals of asylum seekers are affecting the territories in different temporalities and concerning different dimensions of reception and integration. The high numbers of migrants arrivals in 2015 concerned more **Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria** and **Sweden**. Thus the peak of immigration

flows in 2015 has not been an issue for all cases presented. The migration routes employed by migrants networks are constantly determined by border security policies and structures. When traditional routes become impracticable (as **Hungary**), new routes or forms of mobility emerge. However, while routes were widely used in 2015 (Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Bolzano Province and Slovenia), old routes were conserved (**Grande-Synthe, Lampedusa, Greek islands**) and other routes were abandoned or less used in 2015 (**Tenerife and Malta**), and re-activated later on, as observed in **BiH**. Immigration control leads to political elaboration, thus structuring mobility patterns, as in the case of the border closure in **Hungary** that gave impetus to new mobility strategies. Conversely to **Sweden** in 2015, due to an unexpected rising to asylum applications. The government reaction was the introduction of temporary border controls, determining a reduction of asylum applications, accompanied also by a reduction of favorable decisions on applications. The cases highlight the logic of the securitization of borders, where migration control (by structures and legislation), generates irregular migration.





# Chapter II

## 1. Representation of immigration and public opinion

In the last years, support in favour of more restrictive immigration policies is gaining strength in the EU countries (Anaya, Aguilar and Bautista, 2018). All beginning with the so-called “refugee crisis” in 2015, an increased feeling of rejection towards migrants and a more negative perception of immigration broke out. This tendency is not evident in **Spain**, where a “calmer” discourse on immigration tends to be more dominant (Rinken, 2015). The migratory past of the **Canary Islands**

and the intense relationship that the Islands have with Latin America help to explain the positive attitudes that the population has towards immigration. Additionally, we must point out the numerous civil society initiatives, as well as initiatives promoted by local governments promoting the population intercultural

coexistence, which contributed to positive public attitudes. These initiatives are based on different participatory methodologies. In fact, participation and coordination between the NGOs, civil society, and local governments are probably the main strengths of the initiatives undertaken on the island.

**North Aegean Islands** and **Rhodes** citizens have shown positive attitudes: if they are, on the one hand, disappointed by the EU and State response, on the other hand they look with favour at welcoming practices and do not ask for a closed-border policy. However, a less positive public opinion emerged when it comes to integration of refugees, especially from Muslim regions and NIMBY logics are at play.

Conversely, in **Austria** migrants representation in media changed drastically since 2015; this is coupled with the increased popularity of right-wing parties and with a corresponding anti-immigration agenda. Surveys conducted at country level show that negative attitudes towards refugees are prevalent while positive ones hold-up in smaller localities directly affected by immigration. This is especially the case of **Traiskirchen**, while in **Strass** a more polarized public opinion is observed, a clash between welcoming and rejection attitudes.

**Austria** and **Italy** called on the EU to take a stronger engagement in immigration management. In the local investigation conducted in the four Italian territories it was observed a heterogeneous picture ranging from hostility to acceptance. Regarding public opinion, some elements have been observed, the first one is the lack of information. The huge gap between real and perceived immigration, the impressive negative opinions on immigrants contribution to the society, the reported increase of discrimination and the popularity of the anti-immigration and anti-integration political agendas, all show a much polarized public opinion in **Italy**. A survey in the context of **Lampedusa** local investigation showed that in locals opinion the EU should be the prominent actor both in

*After 2015, due to the massive propaganda from the government, migration became a “swear word” in Hungary. During the crisis at Keleti railway station many former refugees joined to help the work of volunteers.” (Ágnes, Social worker at Kalunba, Budapest 12.10.18) Tensions increased at the railway stations (Keleti, Nyugati, Déli – Eastern, Western, Southern), where thousands of asylum seekers were waiting to travel on to Germany and Western Europe.*



migrants rescuing in the sea and first reception.

In **Malta** it was possible to identify the process of labelling and securitize immigration, which is producing an important impact on public opinion. On the other hand, **Malta** is a small island where migrants presence is in part connected with informal job market. In **Marsa** some incidents between citizens and migrants were reported, signs of an increasing hostility. An important factor that is also changing the way Maltese society perceives refugees and asylum seekers by taking an active role in the ongoing discourse.

In **Cyprus**, public opinion is linked to migrants representation. They are being presented and perceived as temporary migrants. However, the main issues in the public debate are the responsibility to accept increased immigration flows, as well as the reception conditions and migrants participation in society. The social integration of immigrants affects social relations (between immigrants and the native population) at individual and community levels (Kasimatis, 2006). **Hungary** is the only of the investigated territories where the government itself has launched and run a fully-fledged anti-immigration campaign including also nationwide surveys and referenda on immigration policy. As shown by the public opinion survey in Siklónagyfalu, Tárki's findings about the peak of xenophobia and the cases of Ócsény and Ásotthalom, public opinion and information concerning migration is deeply distorted by aggression based on fear. Targets are especially Muslims from a religious perspective and Arabs and Africans from a racial one. In the countryside, millions people never had a first-hand experience with migrants,

but they have serious fear of them. Therefore, more awareness-raising efforts and projects must be implemented in **Hungary** to develop a holistic image of sensitising and understanding; these should focus primarily on the countryside where media are very one-sided. Consequently, activities should be real community events - for example art exhibitions, theatre plays and discussions - where locals can meet migrants or refugees in person or introduced by an artist and understand their stories without being continuously manipulated by propaganda.

Much similar to Hungary is to some respects **Slovenia**, where public opinion has been shaped by the media, but it seems that perception changed across time and regarding the migrants categories. However, the strong political anti-immigration propaganda in **Hungary** is not comparable to **Slovenia**. This propaganda is influencing all dimensions of migrants reception and integration. In **Slovenia**<sup>40</sup> when migrants started to apply for international protection the attitude changed at all levels: from the government, to political parties, mass media and civil society. If the prevalent opinion in 2015 was that Slovenia must help "refugees" who are crossing Slovenian territory, in 2018 the general discourse is that Slovenia should protect its borders from economic migrants. Media has a crucial role in shaping public opinion. Lack of the support of mainstream and political elites to the endeavours of NGOs is the main reason why, despite the efforts of the NGOs, the populist vocabulary and hate speech are still prevailing in the public sphere. As in **Slovenia**, in **Sweden** public opinion on immigration changed. Swedish used to have a very positive attitude towards

40 In Slovenia a large gap between real and perceived immigrant population is registered (8% real vs. 20% perceived)

migrants, but in 2015 with the increasing number of asylum seekers and the immigration control starting to be an important issue, people developed more hostile attitudes towards migrants.

The construction of the “refugee crisis” reaffirmed the disputes between political parties on the **Romanian** political scene and in some cases they were even used at political and declarative levels to gain electoral support for the 2016 parliamentary elections. Also it is worth to be noted that at the local level, the authorities, NGOs, media, entrepreneurs and civil society engaged in migration management have shown a responsible attitude and commitment to respond to the migrants’ needs. The local trend is similar to the national one, taking into account that, in terms of public opinion and attitude towards immigrants from the Black Sea border is generally neutral or positive. Some cases of discrimination or negative situations against refugees and migrants are rather isolated incidents or punctual reactions.

Also in **Bulgaria** many of the general trends are confirmed. Public opinion is a matter of political speeches presenting migrants as an existential threat, opening space for political elaboration and legitimizing the absence of migrants’ rights. Political speeches are so closely connected with hostile attitudes and increased vulnerability of migrants. This trend is more or less present in the cases presented, but hostility is not only a matter of speeches.

In **Grande-Synthe**, citizens have not negative attitude towards immigrants. They are more hostile in relation to their living conditions in informal camps (and because the camp is located

in an environmental protection area). Despite the great precariousness embodied in the life within the camps, the solidarity of civil society actors, citizens (often acting alone) and the municipality is present in camps day by day and is ensuring migrants basic needs (water, food, basic health, etc). On the other hand, the municipality has put itself in a certain “political isolation”, due to its position (in favor of the reception of migrants); an isolation that the city tries to mitigate through the creation of a network of welcoming cities.

In **Malta** public opinion is linked to migrants precarious living conditions, who depend on irregular labor market in a so small island. In **Marsa** until now there are only few integration measures taken by Maltese civil society and there is a marked separation between Maltese residents and migrant communities. This is partly fuelled by the media as well as by nationalistic, nativist and populist movements and politicians, countering any positive experiences of encountering ‘the other’.

In **Germany** citizens had experienced a degree of solidarity in 2015. However, citizens have quite high expectations regarding the adaptation of migrants. In villages, people live within a consistent structure of tradition<sup>41</sup>. This causes some citizens to face the arrival of migrants with fear. However, this is not just a phenomena of rural areas, it also occurs in cities. As a result, xenophobia and racism can arise. The local governance of particular categories of migrants (as irregular, asylum seekers, refugees) will also play an important role in shaping public opinion locally.

In **BiH**, migrants and refugees are represented exclusively as a security threat from

41 Kirchhoff, G., 2018. Migration, Integration und demografischer Wandel in ländlichen Gebieten. [talk] (Personal communication, 10 November 2018).











the very beginning<sup>42</sup>. Migrants and refugees from the Middle East countries are presented as covert terrorists, rapists, criminals, and “carriers of infectious diseases”. Such attitudes could be heard from numerous public officials from most of the political parties and from both entities of **BiH**. Such rhetoric was quickly taken over by many domestic media<sup>43</sup>. The use of xenophobic and racist terms, and often with the targeted spread of fear and hatred among the local population and the dehumanization of migrants<sup>44</sup> is common<sup>45</sup>. At the time the articles reported in the footnotes were published, similar “reports” on migrants had not yet been as frequent; this situation would have changed soon, and the media space of **BiH** became literally overwhelmed by the misinformation and false news stories that portrayed migrants as terrorists<sup>46</sup>, robbers<sup>47</sup>, rapists, addicts, and so on. In some cases, violence against migrants in media reports was reported as violence committed by migrants<sup>48</sup>. In

May 2018, the Association of BH Journalists, the Press Council and the Coalition to combat hate speech and hate crime reacted unanimously to unethical and unprofessional media reporting on migrants<sup>49</sup>.

**A few general factors** which play a decisive role in the **acceptance vs. rejection attitude** can be mentioned; emerged in many local investigations, they can be extended to other contexts. Public opinion is shaped by political speeches, which present migrants as an existential threat to society; this threat can be either economic (when migrants are portrayed as a burden) and cultural (when their culture is presented as a threat to national cultural homogeneity) among others. Thus the presence of migrants is not itself a condition to produce hostility. On the other hand, it was observed that the immigration management at the local level is also a determinant of public opinion. The management of migrants in camps

42 Zvizdić D: BiH institutions exclusively responsible for the issue of migrants, Radio Slobodna Evropa, May 22, 2018, <http://bit.ly/2BRTfKq>; Coordinating Body of the Government of the Republic of Srpska established for Monitoring the Movement of Illegal Migrants, Istinomjer, August 5, 2018, <http://bit.ly/2Ew5ttR>

43 Media help institutions increase xenophobia towards refugees and migrants, Mediacentar, May 9, 2018, <http://bit.ly/2Sq1O4q>

44 Are there human beings among refugees and migrants ?, Analyze, November 8, 2018, <http://bit.ly/2Thd6wt>

45 There is some examples drama in the center of Sarajevo: Migrants beat and rob, Dnevni Avaz, May 6, 2018, <http://bit.ly/2BPYnyC>, and The number of migrants is increasing, the help of BiH institution is sought, Al Jazeera / Agencies, May 14, 2018, <http://bit.ly/2NqUiWc>

46 Hugging on the refugees doesn't stop, Raskrinkavanje, 23. 5. 2018, <http://bit.ly/2tGkCm1>; RTRS i “Defter hefte” in the same TV show, Raskrinkavanje, 2. 8. 2018, <http://bit.ly/2T4F-C5q>

47 Criminalization of immigrants and refugees, episode “Bihać”, Raskrinkavanje, 27. 5. 2018, <http://bit.ly/2ExVgx>

48 Attack on migrants, not migrant's attack, Raskrinkavanje, 15. 11. 2018, <http://bit.ly/2tEeOcO>; Shameful reporting “TV1”: A migrant from a victim turned into an attacker, Raskrinkavanje, <http://bit.ly/2IBE-DV>

49 Refugees and migrants have the right on their voice to be heard, BH journalists, 13. 7. 2018, <http://bit.ly/2lzl9PT>

or reception centres in the cities can provoke complex responses from communities where the living conditions of migrants can cause either the hostility or the compassion of the citizens, thus polarizing society.

The hosting community migration background, the presence of a rooted emigration and of an immigration history, both contribute to acceptance of migrants. Conversely, history and memories of a failed integration process in a community or at country level, easily results in rejection attitudes - due to the fear that integration would fail also with other newcomers. Another factor is contact between locals and migrants; this applies both in entry/transit zones, where usually the contacts are limited to operators of migrants receptions and (when the security structures allow) volunteers, and to destination places, where an integration effort is required: increased contact opportunities improve mutual knowledge and result in higher acceptance rates.

One more insight ideally bridge the public opinion issue with the next chapter about local level actors involvement in immigration management. Acceptance and rejection oriented opinions are also linked with **how reception and integration activities are managed**, both as for the state ability to deploy adequate policies and means (better results improve the positive perception of immigration) and, especially, in terms of local actors (both LAs and CSAs) involvement in the reception and integration “industry”. When a structured involvement is in place, it leads to unhostile public opinion thanks to the benefits of increased contacts among groups and to the positive spin-offs on the local community (job opportunities especially); contrariwise, the lack of involvement which occurs when the actors in charge are either the

national authorities or non-local NGOs, easily produces a sense of expropriation - resulting in a less acceptance-oriented public opinion (this is mitigated in cases when external actors are seen as the only able to manage immigration flows, as it emerged in the Greek Islands and, to a lesser extent, in Lampedusa).







## 2. Local Authorities and Civil society actors: limits and success

CSAs have been increasingly important with regard to immigration, particularly at the local level, as the “integration” of migrants occurs primarily locally. They are thus able to support immigrants in diverse areas and to make visible key issues concerning minorities when they are unable to claim their rights. The SfB’s investigation is focused in exploring how and when CSAs cooperates with LAs, and in identifying the constraints they encountered on the field.

Municipalities in **Greece** have a wide range of competencies in the social domain while their competencies in the spheres of labor and employment are far more limited. They provide an extensive network of social services in the area of social security, health care, food and shelter, and other kinds of help. Indeed, even though the municipalities’ social departments provide services to numerous immigrants, integration issues and priorities are not part of the services they can deliver to migrants. There is no horizontal mainstreaming of integration issues and priorities across the various municipal policies. The main stakeholders in the management of migrant crisis in the **Region of North Aegean** are public bodies, voluntary non-governmental organisations, national and international institutions. Among them the most prominent are the Police/Coast Guard, the Municipalities, the Harbour Fund. 123 non-governmental organisations are working in diverse sectors ranging from reception to integration of migrants; what seems clear is the great dependence on the services provided by these actors. In **Rhodes** it is also possible to identify three stages of the development of actors on the migration governance: emergence of volunteer responses in 2015; then they undergo a professionalization and the arrivals of professional NGOs in 2016; and the transfer of responsibility for almost all management to international NGOs (after the EU-Turkey agreement). The main question seems to be the achievement of a better coordination of these different actors.

The Italian context shows different nuances emerging from the investigated territories, in terms of migrant categories and migration projects. In the case of **Lampedusa** local actors have to deal much more with emergency management and first aid than with integration. What really singles out **Lampedusa** is the established presence of CSAs coming from elsewhere. They constitute the grassroots initiatives present in Lampedusa, jointly with a local, mixed and informal network: the Forum Lampedusa Solidale (Solidarity Forum). The province of Ancona, but in general the entire **Marche region**, has always been used to work and collaborate in the social sphere and the migrant crisis has not been the exception: the Prefecture has immediately created coordination tables in which all the actors involved (Municipalities, Health Departments, Region) participated. Originally, regional policies involved different actors: local authorities, third sector bodies, associations. Today the cooperation takes place mainly in the context of projects financed with AMIF and other European funds.

The associations for immigrants in **South Tyrol** can be divided in two kinds of associations: associations founded and run by immigrated communities and local NGOs operating for immigrants. The main activities of these associations are the support in providing and intermediating jobs and apartments to rent and the assistance of their members when approaching the administration and language courses. On the other hand some organizations such as CARITAS and VOLUNTARIUS are operating for immigrants and refugees of any kind. In some municipalities the so called “Councils

of foreign residents" have been established with consultative status. **Puglia Region** intended to encourage a participation process shared from the bottom, aimed at the drafting of the new three-year Plan for the migration policy 2016 – 2018. The process, called MiCS – Shared and Sustainable Migration, was articulated through meetings on four macro-themes, relating to housing, employment, health and integration policies. It involved around 60 local bodies. One of the most important examples, in terms of the fruitful collaboration between Institutions and the Third Sector in Puglia, is represented by the regional Network of the Associations which take part to the project "Puglia non tratta – Insieme per le vittime", aimed at fighting human trafficking.

There is a great diversity of actors engaged in supporting migrants in **Malta** (the same is reported in **Greece**), and the dependence on these actors seems to be increasingly important. However the lack of collaboration between the different stakeholders (NGOs, government institutions, the private sector and citizens) remains a major stumbling block. Government institutions such as AWAS, who runs the IRC and other open centres, are often unable to promote a favorable environment for social inclusion, because they are not flexible enough, they are not politically enabled to do so or they don't have the necessary internal capacities. Therefore, stakeholders need to step up their collaboration efforts.

In **Tenerife** the "refugee crisis" of 2015 had not a significant social impact on the island; however, it has revived different social initiatives whose aim was to raise awareness, and advocate for migrants' rights. There are some participatory projects, which usually work in close collaboration with local institutions.

There are different lines of social intervention with immigrants and citizens, both as volunteers in the projects and as participants in activities: accompaniment in first contact services; advising and accompaniment services; activities designed to raise awareness and promote social advocacy or to promote intercultural coexistence. A common, coordinated policy is lacking on the inclusion of immigrants so as to coordinate the different services on a regional level and, thus, ensure the projects' sustainability. Other areas needed to be improved as: management policy for migration and refugees is a key to ensure human rights; activating different routes to regularization; simplify procedures, ensure participatory and advisory channels, promoting coexistence (comprehensive and inclusive) and actions to prevent racist and xenophobic attitudes.

Immigration is a highly politicized issue in **Hungary**. The relationship between government and NGOs seems to be conflictual. Solidarity actors are currently portrayed as symbols of liberal interventionism and they are subjected to state control and also are a target of insecurity speeches. As a result, feelings of hostility towards the actors and NGOs caught on among citizens. Organisations working on migration-related issues were slandered and funds for integration were cut while the local population's perception was strongly manipulated and distorted by a professional propaganda campaign fueled by public and private media.

NGOs in **Slovenia** are working with migrants directly, their projects focusing on specific aspects of integration of migrants (i.e. learning Slovenian language, information and empowerment for better access to labor market etc.), and indirectly with projects for better social cohesion (project for vulnerable groups;



elderly, Roma, children, etc. where migrants are also taking part). NGOs are trying to involve migrants to contribute to the NGOs' activities/projects/programmes as volunteers helping them to overcome barriers between migrants and general public. The biggest limitation of the present actions is that the all/a huge majority of the activities carried out by NGOs are financed on a project base. The project base financing offers flexibility and quick adjustment to the migrants needs. Though it is clear that, working directly with migration and integration issues, NGOs must have a certain stability regarding financing, not being dependent on the project based financing, as such type of financing is not producing the best results in a long-term perspective. NGOs are using mainly European sources for integration of migrants into Slovenian society as the State is not providing enough financial resources.

In **Austria** the implementation of immigration and Asylum policies involves State institutions, social partners, NGOs as well as migrants associations and researchers. There is a great diversity of actors providing a set of services. Social media support the potential of self-directed action and open up new civil society ways of participation. They organized: (non-cash) donations such as food, medicines, hygiene items, clothing, equipment such as PCs or rooms, as well as monetary donations. In addition, they did translation work, mediated housing in shared or private apartments, taught German, offered other educational measures and encouraged meetings between refugees and local people by providing recreational activities (Simsa 2016: 17-18). However, there is a need to implement projects focused on integration issues.

In **Thuringia** since the '90s a network

for refugee support is being developed with a multiplicity of actors involved, ranging from national, and international NGOs to universities. They are active in different dimensions of the integration process. For **Thuringia** the development and implementation of an "integration" concept represents an important evolution, and will allow to identify actions and actors' competences. A limit to implementation is the coordination and inclusion of all actors involved in the design of this concept. Despite the important actions regarding integration, there is evidence that migrants are not participating actively in discussions and do not share their point of view, they are generally afraid to express their opinion.

In **Romania** there is a favorable legislative framework for integration and CSAs are very active. There are problems related to practices and inter-institutional cooperation, especially on rescue operations. Also roles need to be better defined. The biggest limit is still the issue of subsidies: the lack of financial support from/for the LAs or local budgeting that targets integration of migrants and refugees, along with the development of procedures and capacities at local level. The CSAs have great responsibilities (in several areas) without having resources. They are increasingly dependent on EU funding, and multinationals from the area acted also as valuable donors. There is an attitude of support and solidarity and the local population is engaged in different actions. NGOs, very active locally, provided support on reception and integration issues. Besides occasional projects, there are few channels that favor cooperation between the different actors. The improvement of data collection is also a crucial need.

Despite the multiplicity of actors and projects, actors are facing several limits

to implement actions and support migrants. International and local NGOs have been the main providers of direct humanitarian assistance to migrants and refugees throughout **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The NGOs are providers of direct humanitarian assistance to migrants and refugees, as they are engaged countrywide, in reception centres and in locations with the highest number of migrants. The lack of clear protocols or standard operating procedures setting clear roles, responsibilities, accountability and actions might have a negative impact on vulnerable persons. Additionally, poor understanding of legislation and procedures is a cause for concern, especially regarding potential cases of gender-based violence and unaccompanied children. A lack of coordination with other levels of government, as well as within local administrations, is the main challenge to ensuring an effective local response. The local police forces have not received the appropriate tools, guidelines and training in order to effectively respond to cases involving migrants, and particularly cases of human trafficking. On Prosecutors' Offices and Courts there is a lack of coordination between key law enforcement bodies and prosecutors' offices, and also a lack of adequate data within these institutions regarding victims or perpetrators of crime among the migrants. Though informal groups of volunteers are providing meaningful and quick assistance

to migrants and refugees, their presence in the field is limited. They lack funding. Uncoordinated and unannounced distribution of food and other supplies has the potential to create tensions within the migrants.

In **Grande-Synthe** there is a great diversity of stakeholders acting in camps since 2006. In 2016, the mediatization of migrants in Basroch camp changed actors dynamics, either by the incorporation of new practices (new national and international actors arrived), or by the increase of resources (donations). The associative world in **Grande-Synthe** is complex, it brings together new and long-established actors (national, transnational and international NGOs). Stakeholders are providing mainly basic needs. It appears that the understanding of the context as a transit zone is conditioning the type of response or action. Thus the general perception is that migrants do not have a "vocation to integrate". As a consequence actions focus on basic aspects of life; a great dependence on donations and volunteers is reported; the absence of resources is the main limit, the second is the irregular migration network, much present in camps. The municipality is very active, and support CSAs by organizing regular meetings.

In **Bulgaria** the refugees' integration and social inclusion processes are left entirely to the CSAs<sup>50</sup>. Although doing an excellent

50 According to the report: Community based approaches to inclusion of migrants and refugees in Bulgaria. According to the NATIONAL STRATEGY ON MIGRATION, ASYLUM AND INTEGRATION (2011-2020) the institutional framework for tackling the problems of migration, asylum and integration includes: 1. President of the Republic of Bulgaria 2. Ministry of Interior with (i) Directorate General "Border Police", (ii) Migration Directorate (iii) Migration Units are set up within the regional directorates 3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Consular Affairs Directorate 4. Ministry of Labor and Social Policy with the Employment Agency 5. Ministry of Justice with (i) the Citizenship Council and (ii) the Bulgarian Citizenship Directorate 6. State Agency for National Security 7. State Agency for Refugees at the Council of Ministers 8. State Agency

job, CSAs are unable to provide either full coverage or sustainability of the services, due to their dependence on external funding sources. CSAs are those who support refugees in every step during and after the protection seeking procedure. They are providing translators and Bulgarian language lessons as well as legal and psychological help, preschool and school classes for the children, cultural adaptation activities, etc. At the Forum “Local Integration of refugees: a chance for development” representatives from different organizations presented what they are doing.

The responsibility of migration falls on **Sweden** national authorities, with practical support of local authorities. With the “refugee crises” it became very clear that they could not handle the situation. The whole practical daily work, the solutions to give them shelter and the long term handling and development of the issue fell upon civil society organisations - over time in cooperation with local authorities. Volunteers organised by small or large organisations handled everything, 24 hours a day. There are numerous reports from all levels of society stating very clearly that Sweden would not have been able to handle the situation without civil society. Volunteers greeted refugees arriving in the three largest cities (the places where most migrants arrived) and provided emergency help, food, shelter, medicine etc. In **Sweden** there are 253.000 organisations within civil society and they are organised nationally and internationally. The larger and older organisations (like the Swedish Church, the Red Cross etc) are organised nationally, but newer organisations or local ones are not. CSOs have also been actors

in advocacy and protesting against, among others, temporary laws and the limits to family reunification. Civil society keeps on being very influential in providing care and shelter, access to education etc. Forum (*Idéburna organisationer med social inriktning*) has developed a model of cooperation between local authorities and CSOs since a few years: it is a civil society-public authorities partnership (called IOP). To a large extent it is developing into a cooperative model to work locally and together to find solutions to challenges.

In all cases presented a **multiplicity of stakeholders are engaged in supporting migrants**. The type of actors and domain of action largely depends on the real and on the perceived migration categories. There are some patterns identified: 1) more the context implied a “risk” of migrants lives more international organisation (as OIM, UNHCR or EU operations) are present in local governance of immigration. Here it looks as a global problem, that requires a humanitarian governance (as for **Malta, Greece, Lampedusa and Puglia**); 2) out of these “risk areas” the more the context is understood as a “transit zone”, the more actors will be concentrated on basic needs and less on integration issues (even when migrants presence is constant in some areas). Thus, migrants will be more dependent on civil society actors, and so from solidarity. In the cases of **Hungary and Grande-Synthe** the actors are also criminalised by the State 3) A multiplicity of stakeholders working in different aspects of integration, and in charge of a several domains ranging from legal assistance to promoting multiculturalism and fighting xenophobia. This is observed in cases

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for Bulgarians Abroad at the Council of Ministers 9. Bulgarian National Anti-Trafficking the Council of Ministers

Commission at



perceived over time as a destination for at least a category of migrants (as **Austria, Tenerife and Germany**).

Coordination between the different stakeholders (CSAs, IOs, and municipalities) is an important limit to the development of tools and projects related to migrants integration. As in the case of **Sweden**, where it is clear - from the highest political level to public officials at the local level - that there is the awareness that Sweden would not, and could not manage the challenges of migration without the massive support of civil society. Cooperation was needed, and better planning is a necessity. Even when an important level of coordination was reported (as in **Thuringia, Traiskirchen, Grande-Synthe and Tenerife**), a more inclusive and coordinated approach would be necessary, in particular because the responsibility of reception and/or integration is being constantly transferred from State institutions to CSAs. Another limit is funding: in the cases presented several areas crucial for migrants subsistence (as nutrition, materials, shelter, health care) and integration (as education, social protection, cultural participation and justice), are being transferred to CSAs (either national, transnational and local citizens). However the state do not formalize their tasks and/or do not provide the necessary conditions for their work while their action is an increasingly crucial need (as the case of **Mostar**). In some extreme cases CSAs are the object of political attack, exploited and criminalised by state authorities (as in **Hungary, France** and, more recently, in **Italy**).

The great dependence on “national and EU subsidies”, and on solidarity (lack of volunteers and donations is a major limit shared by territories), and the unpredictability of such resources will lead to migrants vulnerability if

actors become unable to respond to migrants basic needs. Moreover, there is evidence that some migrants categories are being completely excluded from society, thus they can only count on solidarity.







### 3. Immigration and integration issues: challenges and good practices

There is no consensus on a single definition for integration<sup>51</sup>. The IOM defines integration as: The process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. [Integration] refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies [and implies] consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different services and to the labor market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose (IOM, 2011).

Countries face many challenges to make integration policies effective. Following MIPEX<sup>52</sup> data, in EU immigrants are usually under-represented in the most effective employment and education programmes. These include training, recognition of qualifications, job-specific language courses, or domestic degrees, despite the long-term pay-off for their labor market integration. Second, there are not consistent policies based on material evidence (based on pilots, experiments or robust evaluations). These integration policies seems to be highly politicized, thus exposed to changes in the political agenda and interrelated with public opinion. Countries of immigration are increasingly investing in more effective general and targeted programmes, also based on a more personalised general and targeted support. But many may be still too new or too small to reach the numerous TCNs, who rarely access trainings or unemployment benefits. On the other hand, new immigration countries needed to develop integration policies. Policies largely determine whether immigrants are settling down permanently, their social and political rights and citizenship. As MIPEX report highlights: **restricting permanent residence and citizenship leads to large numbers of ‘permanently temporary’ foreigners who are legally precarious and socially excluded**. Immigrants’ access to services is not only dependent on their legal status, also the state perception of particular migrants categories seems to be determinant regarding integration. The approach to integration issues (it includes also the actors) is highly dependent on the migration category: it was observed that transit or entry areas, where migrants population is perceived as “mobile” are not consistently implementing integration policies, or ensuring rights, services or opportunities regarding this category. This is observed even in traditional immigration countries (as France), where integration policies are considered developed. On the other hand it is also dependent on the government political position regarding immigration: in cases where a country is positioned against immigration and employing a securitization approach, migration and even CSAs are being criminalized, thus increasing migrants vulnerabilities.

In the case of “transit migrants” the civil society actors, national and transnational NGOs are much more present in providing basic services to migrants. This is more the case of **Greece, Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania and Grande-Synthe**. These cases raise questions on how it would be possible to implement effective integration policies in a context where migrants are continuously presented as having no “vocation” to remain in the country. Integration issues cover social, economic and cultural dimensions; they involve a multiplicity of stakeholders facing challenges and developing projects to support migrants, who are excluded from the society.

51 See also mipex : <http://www.mipex.eu/>

52 Huddleston, and Sánchez-Montijano, E. (2015). Integration Policies: Who Benefits? Policy Brief Available on: [http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex\\_integration-policy\\_policy-brief.pdf](http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex_integration-policy_policy-brief.pdf)



In **Malta** NGOs are promoting contact between different social groups. The **Righ2Smile** project for example is focused on young migrants and Malta citizens. It ensures the participation of all groups because they can choose and propose activities. The success of the project can be explained with the genuine approach the organisation is taking with the community, working with an open and inclusive space for everyone. This project is new and there is no information on the long-term impact. Regarding integration policies, the main category of concern is asylum seekers. Since refugee flows are rather new to **Malta** until now legislative measures are few. Usually any regulation follows a rationale for foreign investment and therefore benefits wealthy third country nationals by making it comparatively easy for them to obtain a residence or even citizenship. On the other hand, regulations or policies affecting refugees and asylum seekers are mostly restrictive rather than enabling their social inclusion and empowerment. For the latter, obtaining citizenship proves rather impossible and, although it is possible for refugees and asylum seekers to find legal work in **Malta**, access to the labor market is difficult and chances for a social and economic upward mobility are low. In all cases presented migrants inclusion is dependent on several “assets”, as juridic (visa acquisition) and cultural (language and possibility to communicate and interact in host society). As in the case of **Malta** migrants and asylum seekers are more vulnerable and more probably victims of exploitation on the informal labor market.

The asylum procedure in **Greece** is a long-term process where the asylum applicants wait for more than a year to receive a decision. The central government is responsible for the development and implementation of migrant

integration programmes in cooperation with the municipal authorities. Municipalities have assumed an increasingly proactive role in dealing with the reception of newcomers, as well as with the challenges facing the long-term integration of legally residing migrants. Local and municipal authorities, independently or in cooperation with other public agencies and non-governmental organisations, are the providers of a large array of social services in the area of health, education and childcare. Currently, the integration process of the asylum-seekers and recognised refugees in the **Region of North Aegean** is supported by “ESTIA” accommodation and cash assistance programme. The access to education of refugee children and adults and access to employment is possible mostly through the initiative of NGOs and civil society. So far more than 1,163 people benefitted of the integration assistance. **Rhodes** Municipalities and other local bodies have assumed an increasingly proactive role in dealing with the reception of newcomers, as well as with the challenges in facing the long-term integration of legally residing migrants. Municipalities are also responsible for maintaining the social infrastructure of cities where many ethnic and migrant communities live. Thus, the Municipality of **Rhodes** has created, with its own resources, a municipal site for the temporary stay of migrants and refugees until their departure to mainland Greece. The aim is to provide all the necessary humanitarian services to the refugees and immigrants arriving in the island in an organized and secure manner, as well as to protect the image of the island as a world renowned tourist destination from a potentially uncontrollable situation. However, over 17.000 people remain crammed in Greek island reception centers with a total capacity for only 6.000, living in desperate conditions which

do not meet the basic humanitarian standards. Thus for these people it is not possible to ensure, security, health care, employment, education, etc, in the time they stay in islands centers. The proposed measures for the improvement of the provided services by the stakeholders managing asylum seekers and refugees are concerning the following sectors: protection, feeding, health and nutrition, transport, housing, hygiene and material supplies, support to local communities. In **Greek Islands** improvements, financial and institutional, are needed at all levels.

Even though major improvements have been made to asylum-seekers' social inclusion process, **Cyprus** has not managed to establish an effective system to support asylum-seekers while they await decisions on their legal status. The system can be described as slow and bureaucratic, out of which many consequences arise, such as frustration, poverty and negative feelings. The Reception Regulations stipulate that all asylum-seeking children have access to education under the same conditions that apply to citizens, immediately after applying for asylum and no later than three months from the date of submission of the asylum application. With health services for asylum-seekers some barriers were identified: inadequate information and insufficient support in interpreting and translation. Moreover, health professionals lack cultural understanding and knowledge of torture, trauma and violence, thus they do not provide specialized assistance. Asylum-seekers' health can significantly deteriorate because of the social isolation, loss of status and family, uncertainty, hostility, housing difficulties, poverty and loss of autonomy. One major obstacle for asylum-seekers is the inability

to communicate. Asylum-seekers in **Cyprus** are allowed and encouraged to work one month after lodging their asylum application. However, their access to employment is limited to certain sectors considered unattractive and underpaid. Asylum-seekers are considered unskilled workers; the majority of the sectors in which they can be employed are located in remote rural areas; their inability to communicate in Greek or English hinders their efficient communication. Employers in the agricultural sector very often demonstrate a lack of interest and refuse to employ asylum-seekers. In fact, many employers in these sectors often prefer to employ third-country nationals who arrive in the country with an employment permit and are authorized to work for a period of up to 4 years (Drousiotou and Mathioudakis, 2015). The social inclusion of immigrants, therefore, depends on the legal status in the host country and on integration into the labor market to ensure social protection (Kasimatis, 2006). The lack of legal and civil protection to immigrants perpetuates violations of human rights and lead immigrants to live in a hostile environment without rights, where their condition is determined by their status of "cheap labor" for the illegal labor market.

In **Spain**, the law that regulates the entry and stay of TCNs, their rights and social integration is known as the "Immigration Law"<sup>53</sup>. There is a significant difference between the rights of migrants from an EU country and regular TCNs, and irregular migrants: the first two categories have social and political rights (almost the same of Spanish citizens). Irregular migrants have very limited rights instead, also because of administrative practices at a national

53 Organic Law 4/2000, and successive modifications, Organic Laws 8/2000, 14/2003, and 2/2009. whose regulations for implementation are included in Royal Decree 557/2011





and local level, what makes complex their access to basic services and the recognition of basic rights. In addition to the vulnerabilities that “not having papers” bring about: occupational exploitation in the underground economy, overcrowding in houses that are often unfit and - in some cases - do not have electricity and water. One of the main problems noted by immigrants, especially those of Latin American origin, is the recognition of university degrees. As the recognition procedure is expensive and long (in many cases exceeds four years) as it involves the translation and legalization of all documents (diplomas, grade transcripts, etc.). Recognition of degrees represents an important obstacle to the immigrants’ successful search for employment (similar cases are reported from **Italy** as well). Nevertheless, one of the main strengths in this area is that many educational centres have intercultural programs with vast experience in managing diversity. In **Tenerife** different challenges have been identified regarding integration, all of which are linked with the need of immigration policy based on human rights, far-reaching and equal participation. The latter aspect makes reference to the need to define a far-reaching national and European policy to cover from the outermost fringes of the border territories to the centre. That is to say, an European policy that takes into account the experiences, needs, and the initiatives that are being undertaken in border territories.

Exploitation in the labor market is also an important issue in **Puglia**. In order to address this issue innovative projects have been developed, which influenced the elaboration of policies. Integration in **Italy** has a complementary function for national and European regulations.

Local competences are limited to some classical fields of integration policies such as the social policy, social housing regulations, cultural affairs, education system, public health service, professional vocational training and labor market incentives. It is also important to consider the particularity of the SPRAR-system, which allows an integrated decentralized accommodation involving local authorities and actors in order to provide housing, catering, health services, educational efforts, language courses, legal assistance and some support for job seekers and employment with local enterprises. The program has been discontinued in 2018<sup>54</sup>. As mentioned before integration policies are dependent of migrants categories, and/or on how migrants are being perceived by the governments.

There is no or only a little support for the integration of transiting migrants, as is the case of **Lampedusa**. There migrants wait for relocation. Even if they do not spend a long time on the island, individuals and networks used (as long as security structures made this possible) to host migrants in their houses and play as mentors by teaching them the language and giving practical advice. **Marche** region seems to be more concerned by unaccompanied minors and is involved in the hospitality of migrants. Neither Hotspots and CPAs are present. For Marche the fight against discrimination is a major issue. In 2014 joined the No.Di - No Discrimination project, in order to work for the inclusion and overcoming of racial discrimination. From a political point of view, one of the biggest obstacles to integration is the creation of a dichotomy between intervention for asylum seekers and integration intervention. The emergency landings have shifted all political and institutional attention, and that of public

54 See Chapter I, Section 3.

opinion, on the phenomenon of asylum seekers, abandoning the integration processes of immigrants already present in the territory.

In **South Tyrol** the provincial act for integration has been approved only in 2011, creating the legal framework for integration. The act provides for incentives for the linguistic and cultural integration, reinstates equal rights and parity for immigrants in social assistance, health services, social housing, education and for intercultural mediators. Unemployment rate among immigrants in **South Tyrol** is lower than in the rest of the country. However there is an additional challenge for the integration of migrants due to the Italian-German bilingualism and to the related requirements linked to the proportionality rule regarding jobs in the public sector.

In **Puglia**, on occasion of MiCS meetings, emerged the need to promote, in conjunction with a plan of training and capacity building for public operators (also on the issues of human trafficking and sexual and labor exploitation), an institutional communication campaign aimed at raising the awareness of public opinion and at tackling the unjustified fears and discriminatory cultures against immigrants. To promote integration, it is considered important to invest in training, and give a particular attention to unaccompanied minors who reach the age of majority. In regard to the housing, the experimentation of forms of family reception become desirable, focusing on widespread models, such as the promotion of a public-private system addressed to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. The interventions against the traffic and the sexual and labor exploitation of migrants (men, women and children), remain a top priority for **Puglia**, which shows a persistence of these phenomenon.

**Slovenia** has a considerable

experience of integration of migrants who came from the republics of former Yugoslavia, having partially similar historical, linguistic and cultural experiences. Instead it has little practical experiences with the integration of migrants coming from outside the closer neighbourhood (e.g. Africa, Middle East, Asia, Albanian community, etc.). **Slovenia** must invest more institutional and human resources in order to compensate the shortage of experiences and knowledge. The best way is to transfer and adapt best practices from other EU countries with similar circumstances but even this could be not enough if state stakeholders do not behave proactively. The current activity of the state is somehow passive and just following and monitoring the situation and reacting if necessary. On occasion of the past immigration experience of very numerous Albanians (from Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia), integration issues were neglected. This results in “poorly” integrated Albanian community in many **Slovenian** cities. There is evidence that a more proactive state stakeholders would engage also other stakeholders (especially local communities) to contribute more to the effective integration of migrants into Slovenian society. Integration still seems to be heavily dependent on NGOs.

In the **Nordhausen** district in **Thuringia** there are many opportunities and projects to integrate migrants and enable them to participate in social life. However, most of the offers are designed by local citizens without the participation of migrants in the development process. Sometimes is difficult for refugees and migrants to get information they need upon arrival. Is reported a lack of structures and final reports were missing. A meeting between local citizens and migrants would be important to ensure the social participation of migrants.

Their ideas should be heard and integrated into processes.

**Bulgaria** does not have a governmental programme for integration of refugees. All integration measures and services are provided by CSAs and volunteers. **The major CSAs' initiatives for the integration of refugees are:** integration services (including housing, social mediation and psychological support); language classes for children, facilitation of the access to social and health services, professional training; initiatives for social empowerment, as mentorship programmes, social mediators, cultural events, sports, etc. There is an important issue related to the elaboration of integration policies. SAR has managed a National Programme for Integration of the Refugees between 2005 and 2013, which has not been continued since 2014. According to this programme the "refugee was getting an individual integration plan including temporary integration measures". There are many hindrances on the way to integrate refugees in the Bulgarian society. One of the major obstacles is the perception of the asylum seekers that Bulgaria is a transit country, unavoidable stop on their route to Western and Northern Europe. As a result many of the asylum seekers either enter and cross the country illegally, or they leave the Reception Center at the first opportunity. A serious challenge is the political dimension of integration, where political parties are trying to receive benefits supporting anti-immigration speech.

The challenge for **Romania** regarding the relationship among citizenship, immigration and integration is the balance between security, freedom, human rights, economic and demographic interests, control and respect for human dignity. Among the difficulties of

migrants and refugees in their path of integration in **Romania** and **Constanța**, those related to the knowledge of the Romanian language and access to social protection emerge. This trend is more visible among women. In Constanța, Romanian language courses are organized by the Constanța County School Inspectorate. Without these courses migrants needed to count on NGOs support with the language courses. There is a need for more State support in organizing language courses. Another priority area is the unawareness of migrants rights. In this issue the civil society plays an important role. **Romanian** laws grant many rights to migrants (as work, healthcare, social allowances, and education), but do not ensure political representation. These areas are responsibilities of the public authorities, government, and civil society that should and must work together. The access to health implies a number of difficulties as: information about the rights and procedures (payment of health insurance and registration to a family doctor), regulation and cultural mediation.

Migrants' rights are in no way aligned those of citizens in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The City of **Mostar** is in a very difficult position for years and the rights of its citizens are violated, with the migration crisis making the situation even more complex. The jurisdiction over the migration issues is on the State and Entity level (except the education part which belongs to Cantonal level) and it is difficult to impact on, or change, the crucial issues at the cantonal and local levels in an operational perspective. Practices related to integration at local level are hardly existent, while the migrants are totally separated from the citizens. In **Bosnia and Herzegovina** a person first needs to express intention to seek asylum.



The procedure is complex<sup>55</sup>, long and involves different decision makers. Several factors hinder a fair and efficient access to asylum. Institutions have limited capacity to register and process asylum claims and have been slow in scheduling registration procedures. Furthermore, while significant improvements have been made in the recent months, challenges remain with regard to the timely identification of UASC and the subsequent appointment of a legal guardian: a necessary first step to enter the asylum process<sup>56</sup>. Without the approval of the asylum status, it is impossible for migrants and refugees to become regularly employed. Furthermore, citizens have been increasingly frustrated by the presence of refugees living in precarious conditions in their neighborhoods and have been putting pressure on local authorities to address the situation<sup>57</sup>.

Integration was a long-neglected area of **Austrian** politics. For a long time, the idea of a temporary immigration of “migrant workers” was established. At the federal level integration policy efforts began with the so-called “integration agreement” in the Settlement and Residence Act in 2002. New immigrants from third countries are thus obliged to participate in German and integration courses. In 2010, the National Action Plan for Integration, which

outlined the guidelines for an integration policy, was adopted. It contains a detailed catalog of general integration policy guidelines, challenges and goals and its implementation is supported by a panel of experts. **Austria** has caught up with integration policy<sup>58</sup>, given to it content and ideas, and has also institutionally framed it. The Foreign Minister is also the Minister of Integration; the different local authorities cooperate in an integration advisory board.

In June 2016 the **Hungarian parliament** has discontinued all state-funded integration supports. Previously available services such as language courses, support for accommodation and help with job seeking were no longer available. Asylum-seekers were allowed to stay in reception camps for one month after they were granted protection only. During that period their documents were supposed to be issued, but often they had to wait for several months instead. According to the new regulations, they could no longer stay in the camps, neither were they entitled to receive other support. Before the changes, asylum-seekers could stay for two months in reception camps and then go to the Bicske pre-integration camp for an additional six months and participate in language and social integration trainings. Nowadays, they must leave

55 As an example, from 31 March 2019, 25,352 formally expressed intention to seek asylum, but only 1,641 chose and were able to formally lodge an asylum claim with the SA. Further the SA, conducted 5 Refugee Status Determination Interviews in a month

56 UN in BiH (2019): Monthly Operational Updates on Refugee/Migrant Situation, March 2019, Inter-agency Refugee/Migrant Situation Report, 10-11. <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/bih/PDFs/UNCTBiHSitReps/Inter-agency%20refugee%20and%20migrant%20operational%20update-%20March%202019.pdf>

57 Minca C and Umek D (2019): The new front of the refugee crisis in the Balkans. 14/02/2019 <https://societyandspace.org/2019/02/14/the-new-front-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-the-balkans/>

58 In Austria in 2014, the responsibility for integration policy was transferred from the Federal Ministry of the Interior to the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA)

the camp after one month and do not receive any support from public bodies, relying on the few remaining civil organisations and churches (Deutsche Welle, 2017). This occurs even if there is a major labor shortage in Hungary. Asylum-seeking children over the age of 16 are not offered the possibility to attend school until they receive protected status. Humanitarian protection can be granted in the meantime, for maximum one year, but rights and services are rather limited. There are few institutions that accept refugee children and are able to offer programmes according to their specific needs. Many local schools are reluctant to accept foreign children because they lack the necessary expertise to provide additional tutoring to asylum-seekers; moreover Hungarian families express their hostile feelings toward asylum-seeking children.

Despite the fact that **Sweden** has received an important number of asylum applications, the asylum reception and integration is not a simple issue. As said, policy regarding integration issues has been harmonized with community acquis lately, but it is not well developed yet. Civil society actors are thus the main actors in charge of integration issues. Refugees view civil society as their ally and their way to be included in **Sweden**. Many people are explicit on civil society organisations and individual volunteers being absolutely vital to their ability to live in Sweden. Many of them are

also clear on civil society being the place where they go to get explanations on administrative routines and decisions made by the authorities.

The **French** asylum law stipulates measures concerning immigration and asylum policy. The integration of migrants' populations in France follows the republican model<sup>59</sup>. The integration and citizenship first pass through access to rights. However migrants living in "informal camps" in **Grande-Synthe** have no access to rights or services ensured by the state. An important issue in **Grande-Synthe** is convincing migrants to go to reception and orientation centers (CAO), because once they arrive in CAOs, they have 30 days to apply for asylum (not all of them can/want to apply). From March 2017 to August 2018 the French Office of immigration and integration (OFII) carried out the transfer of 7997 migrants from camps to CAOs. However, in Grande-Synthe, it is more appropriate to talk about "circular transfer", as migrants stay between two days and three weeks in CAOs and return to camp. The CSAs consider this method ineffective. Another fundamental question is information. The transfer operations are not made in consultation with actors presents in the camps. So they are unable to inform and reassure migrants, and because they don't feel safe, part of the population disperse before and during these operations. Migrants living in camps are not part of a homogeneous legal category. However, they are often defined as "migrants

59 On the republican model Hollifield argue that « it can be nationalist and imperialist, while at the same time stressing universal political values, such as equal protection of all individuals before the law » (Hollifield, 2006 :59 ). From 90 to 2013, integration is a question managed by the High Council for Integration (HCI) "this French model of integration comes from a return to the sources of a thought that rejected determinism of ethnicity, class, religion , relying on the collective will ensure a past, but especially to jointly claim common ambitions and goals. Based on a principle of equality, it is opposed to the logic of minorities» (HCI, 1993:08).

who want to go to UK”, so they are associated with the idea of migrants who have no vocation to integrate in the society. This image of “migrant in transit” is important because it serves as a basis to justify the absence of rights, and integration policies elaborated for them. The challenge identified in **Grande-Synthe** is to eliminate the logic of the camps, a complex question that depends as much on the geographical position of the city, as on the migratory projects and irregular migration networks. If the camps are destroyed, they are rebuilt elsewhere because **Grande-Synthe** is part of a migratory route. This refers to the complex dynamic which link camps, irregular immigration networks and the absence of opportunities at national and local level. On the CSAs’ dimension, the core element which limits their actions is the exhaustion of resources (material and human). Profound fatigue is also evidenced; the camp cycle (construction, deconstruction and reconstruction) also causes deep frustration on migrants and CSAs. The latter are left with the great responsibility to support migrants living in camps. They are involved in the distribution of material, health, information and legal support without having the necessary resources to do so.

Integration issues in the cases presented seems to be highly sensitive to the category of migrant, or on how the state perceives this immigration. When immigration is perceived as non-permanent, as being transitory for example, civil society actors seem much more involved in providing support, as immigrants are not of a category that will “integrate in the society”.







## Recommendations

Main needs identified during the investigation and shared by members are:

- Activating different ways to regularization in all territories; simplify procedures.
- Ensure participatory and advisory channels between CSO and LA's.
- Provide for an honest, facts- and knowledge-based information, from the local to the national and EU levels.
- Definition and adoption of an efficient programme for integration of refugees.
- Develop a horizontal plan of sensitization activities for local communities that host refugees.
- Strengthening of collaboration and implementation of integration activities between local civil society and local authorities with emphasis on vulnerable groups (i.e. children, women, elders).
- Facilitate integration venues (as language learning, social protection, job market) from national to local level.
- Need of material and human resources. More financial incentives should be given to Las and CSA to support their efforts in the integration of refugees on their territory.
- Monitoring integration by an independent actor. An independent organization to evaluate different aspects of the integration, e.g. the awareness of the refugees regarding the opportunity to participate in integration programmes.
- Improvement of communication among interested organizations and interested communities so as to better coordinate the social services offered and foster strong linkages among them.
- Improvement of communication among migrants and State institutions.
- An assessment/analysis of the knowledge and competences of the people who work for the integration of refugees, including civil servants, LA personnel, members of CSOs, etc.
- Social inclusion of migrants needs to be elaborated from below, in observance of the local communities and addressing multicultural and participatory approach for all stakeholders (including CSO, Las, citizens and migrants).
- Development of local policy focusing on social and economic mobility to support successful integration of migrants.
- Elaboration of individual training for personnel working directly with migrants and refugees.
- An assessment of the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the financed activities aiming at the integration of refugees should be done.

# Multidisciplinary Practices identified at local level



Location And Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>SOFIA, BULGARIA</b> <b>Caritas Sofia</b>	Social Housing for Refugees	Housing assistance (renting premises and covering the costs of rent and utilities for 6 months). And access to integration services (Bulgarian language classes; job; enrolling children in kindergarten, school; etc.)	
<b>BULGARIA</b> <b>Bulgarian Red Cross</b>	Individual integration	Transportation, social and educational support (support for enrolment at kindergarten and school; mandatory health insurance payments, language classes, professional training in professions with a high demand on the labor market. Limited to 5 people/year)	Assisted 40 people a year
<b>SOFIA, BULGARIA</b> <b>Caritas Sofia, BRC,</b> <b>Council for Women</b> <b>Refugees in Bulgaria,</b> <b>IOM Cooperation for</b> <b>Voluntary Services</b> <b>(CVS)</b>	Mini labor exchange	Access to labor market. Intermediation between employers and refugees which helps both sides to reach each other. Every participant got a folder with information in their native language about his/her basic labor rights and obligations and an individual schedule for interviews	100 refugees met 6 employers and HR agencies.
<b>SOFIA, BULGARIA</b> <b>Caritas Sofia,</b> <b>MultiKulti Collective,</b> <b>other CSOs</b>	Festival of solidarity in Sofia	Promoting multiculturalism. To celebrate solidarity, empathy, understanding and tolerance in their broad sense with a series of events such as movie screenings, concerts, discussions, workshops, storytelling, culinary experiences and more. Theatre of Crumbs - an event for community kneading and mixing together	Creation of actions based on cultural exchange (food, henna workshop, folk costumes exchange). Promoting contact between groups
<b>GRANDE-SYNTHÉ,</b> <b>FRANCE</b> <b>Municipality</b> <b>Grande-Synthe</b>	Consultation meetings	Horizontal coordination. The practice is achievable, reproducible, sustainable and ensuring the participation. Periodic meetings planned by city hall ensured the representation of the actors involved in the management of camps.	Achievement of a great coordination and trust between stakeholders
<b>GRANDE-SYNTHÉ,</b> <b>FRANCE</b> <b>Municipality</b> <b>Grande-Synthe</b>	Access to education for children living in camps	Education. At the Linière camp, the action carried out by city hall and National Education (through the public school), which aimed at facilitating the access to French education for migrants living at the camp. They provided transport and information to parents	About 10 children participated during the camp existence

Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>GRANDE-SYNTHE, FRANCE</b> <b>Mobile Refugees Support</b>	"Food packs"	Autonomy in everyday life. Migrants in the camps can choose the products they need to cook, order them and the association is back on the camp with their orders. This basic action of choosing products and cooking by themselves has a real social value for people living in camps	Produce a social value for people living in camps and reduce tensions between migrants, and reduction of waste
<b>TRAIKIRCHEN, AUSTRIA</b> <b>Kinderfreunde association</b>	Connect. Traiskirchen	Focus on unaccompanied minors. Leisure time and studying for young refugees, where an estimated number of 1.600 unaccompanied minor, aged from 14 to 17, stayed in the reception centre. The main activity was to offer child care once a week (playing football, language courses, child care, coaching was done by volunteers). A precondition was the good collaboration between the municipality and the association Kinderfreunde (rooms and transport). One challenging aspect of the project was the infrastructure. Another one was team building and volunteer turnover	The organizing people were successful in addressing the average citizens of Traiskirchen, (even sceptical) Those were invited to come and watch or contribute with their particular skills or ideas, Capitalization: it inspired other similar projects, participation of 900 migrants.
<b>TRAIKIRCHEN, AUSTRIA</b> <b>Traiskirchen Municipality</b>	Garten der Begegnung/ Garden of Encounter	Promoting contact by agriculture. Plot of cultivated land was dedicated to the project by the municipality. Farming and gardening started in spring 2016. There are regular festivals: as the Newroz Kurdish New Year, and every time someone receives a positive asylum. Refugees from the Garden of Encounter plant fruit trees of old, endangered varieties. Refugees give something back to hosting community.	Asylum seekers and citizens work together. The agricultural products are sold for donations. What is not sold goes to the local cooperative market "the good store", for disadvantaged citizens.
<b>TRAIKIRCHEN, AUSTRIA</b> <b>Private Initiative joined by local community</b>	Mommy's Coffee Time	All weeks refugees families meet with an Austrian supporter in a tavern, owned by the mayor of Traiskirchen. The project was founded by a pedagogue aware that mothers had to sleep unsheltered with their babies in Traiskirchen in 2015. It started with a "mobile station". Two months later the mayor opened his "Heurigen" (a tavern wine cellar) for pregnant women and babies. Supporters started participating.	20 families meet once a week. It works as a social meeting point where Refugees get support in bureaucratic affairs, consulting on various issues and become a member of a community.

Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>STRASS, AUSTRIA</b> <b>ARGE</b> Flüchtlingspatenschaften Südsteiermark (working group for refugee mentoring)	ARGE Flüchtlingspatenschaften/ Working group refugee sponsorships	Support on integration issues. In 2015 a group of people got together with the aim to support refugees when they arrived at the border or crossed it. This group is still active. They are helping refugees in every possible way: support in bureaucratic affairs, medical care, organizing German classes or language exchange, help with searching for jobs, legal advice and awareness-raising among the Austrian citizens and promoting cultural exchange	They are very effective in helping refugees e.g. with legal support or language courses. Proving that supporting reduces integration costs, and in a non-bureaucratic way
<b>CONSTANTA, ROMANIA</b> <b>The Regional Integration Centres (Constanța)</b>	Funded by AMIF	Focus on vulnerable and special needs, by offering them complementary services to those provided by the State. The services include: information, counselling, material, legal, medical, psychological support, as well as social, cultural, educational, recreational activities and Romanian language courses and orientation.	It plays a very important role in establishing a basic level of trust between migrants, refugees and the host community
<b>CONSTANTA, ROMANIA</b> <b>Constanța Territorial Immigration Service</b>	Local Information campaigns	Raising-awareness activities targeting foreign students from Constanța and the employers at local level, respectively the rights and obligations of foreign workers.	Citizens are better informed
<b>Galati ROMANIA</b> <b>Children's rooms</b>	Local NGOs Centre for Procedures and Accommodation for Asylum Seekers	Improving reception. The conditions from the reception centres are extremely poor and there is a permanent risk, because of overcrowding and the sanitation issues, and most often the children are neglected. In order to improve the reception conditions in centres, there have been created friendly facilities dedicated to activities for children.	Improvement of Centre reception conditions. Promotion of counselling, educational, recreational, material and financial support, psychological and rights counselling
<b>MARSA, MALTA</b> <b>Right2Smile</b>	Right2Smile projects	The NGO offers different activities for young people. The activities are developed based on the interest of the young people and/or parents demands. Right2Smile is focused on integration and inclusion of all communities, aiming to normalise the perception and coexistence of different communities in Marsa. The project is successful in terms of number of participants and the activities are demand among the students. With this approach Right2Smile managed to create a space where Maltese students and students with a migration background can interact.	improve the living conditions, prevent social exclusion by offering opportunities for people to come together



Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>NORTH AEGEAN ISLANDS and RHODES, GREECE</b> <b>ESTIA programme</b>	Integration process of asylum seekers and recognised refugees supported by "ESTIA"	"ESTIA" accommodation and cash assistance programme on access to education of refugee children and adults and access to employment mostly through the initiative of NGOs and civil society. So far more than 1,163 people benefit from the integration assistance. Some of the best practices obtained during the management of migrant flows are: The improvement and standardisation of rescue process and transportation to reception centres. The standardisation of procedures on recording and examining asylum applications, which did not exist in the islands. The translation of instructions for the asylum application process in the native languages. Participation in pan-European conferences for the solidarity networks. Adjustment of medical treatment psychological support of refugees and migrants. The distribution of humanitarian aid from donations. Individual support in vulnerable groups. The creative occupation of unaccompanied children.	Involve different social groups, reducing prejudice and empower migrants
<b>HUNGARY</b> <b>Kalunba Association</b>	Supporting the integration of refugees and migrants	Providing a more holistic approach on integration issues. Kalunba provides housing support, language classes, legal support, job searching and employment support, cultural mediation and adult education and after school education for migrant children.	Support more than 150 people
<b>HUNGARY</b> <b>Local NGOs</b> <b>Lilla Zentai</b>	Raising awareness through the movie "Reception"	Public awareness. The film "Reception" by Lilla Zentai presents the personal stories of migrants living in Hungary and people who accepted them into their homes <sup>1</sup> . It is a good way to show Hungarian citizens that former refugees are able to be integrated into society, and also to show that supportive and receptive behaviour can efficiently help the integration process.	
<b>TENERIFE, SPAIN</b> <b>Network composed of about 100 entities coordinate by Tenerife Island Council and the University of La Laguna</b>	"Juntos en la misma dirección"	Promote the dialog and intercultural coexistence through the undertaking of different participatory processes. These activities include: the creation of a set of thematic workgroups (as gender-based violence, childhood, religious dialog, anti-racism, etc), they are organized autonomously, defending its agenda, goals, intervention strategies, and coordinating and cooperating with the other groups through participatory spaces and channels	Network of 100 different stakeholder and more than 2,000 people participate each year in the project's activities.

1 Available at: <https://player.vimeo.com/video/167763623>

Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>TACO METROPOLITAN AREA, SPAIN</b> The government, technical /professional resources, and citizens play a joint role driven by “La Caixa Social Work”	Proyecto de Intervención Comunitaria Intercultural	Focus on coexistence and social cohesion based on the strengthening of a community process. It is an innovative initiative for community intervention and for the management of social and cultural diversity as validated by their results and their impact on improving coexistence. Promotion intercultural coexistence through a community empowerment process that includes neighbours' reassessment and re-identification of their area/neighbourhood, including comprehensive citizen actions	Sustainability. This is a project that has been undertaken successfully and effectively in forty territories throughout Spain since 2010.
<b>TENERIFE, SPAIN</b> Spanish Red Cross	Social inclusion process	Inclusion by the promotion of comprehensive advising services. It involves: information, social advising, and remittance to internal and external resources; coverage by social emergency subsidies; accompaniment and support in relationship with administrative paperwork and financial paperwork; legal advising on immigration law; processing of documentation, the accompaniment to the foreigner's office; personal, couple, and family care services and intervention services; training, Spanish classes, occupational guidance; management of self-help groups, “family search, messaging, and contact reestablishment”	Covers several areas related to inclusion and producing social innovation
<b>BARCELONA and TENERIFE, SPAIN</b> Network of Intercultural Cities (RECI) and linked to the Council of Europe	Anti-rumour Strategy to Combat Racism and Xenophobia	The innovative idea around which the Barcelona Anti-Rumour Strategy is based, and what has acted as inspiration for Tenerife, is that any individual, in any context, can be a communicative agent for change. Tenerife's strategy gives special emphasis on participatory dimension and dialog, and also taking into account alternative methodologies than “counterexample logic” methodology that was characteristic of the initial model (Zapata and Ramallo, 2015).	a fruitful encounter between activism, local institutions, and scientific investigation. Capitalization: Tenerife experience inspired the strategy and is currently in expansion through different European territories
<b>TENERIFE, SPAIN</b> Cáritas Diocese of Tenerife	“migration program”	Accompaniment for immigrants in situations of social vulnerability through the work of volunteers and the entity's technical staff; and, awareness raising and advocacy aiming to make the reality of migration more visible.	mobilizes 900 volunteers to create a vast and heterogeneous accompaniment network.

Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF BOLZANO, ITALY</b> <b>Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen, South Tyrol. Provincial Consultative Council of Integration</b>  <a href="http://www.provincia.bz.it/famiglia-sociale-comunita/integrazione/lavoro-in-rete/consulta-provinciale-per-l-integrazione.asp">http://www.provincia.bz.it/famiglia-sociale-comunita/integrazione/lavoro-in-rete/consulta-provinciale-per-l-integrazione.asp</a>	Provincial Consultative Council for Integration	a centre of reference for local administrators, decision makers, private companies and other stakeholders in integration of immigrants	Among other activities it has released manuals on integration for enterprises and local administrations
<b>AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF BOLZANO, ITALY</b> <b>South Tyrol. Local Authorities</b>	Network of Municipal Commissioner for Integration	Coordination of the local activities for integration of migrants at large at municipal level	
<b>PUGLIA REGION, ITALY</b> <b>Puglia Region, jointly with the Prefecture of Foggia, association, agencies, institutions, trade unions, companies, employers' organizations</b>	Capo free, ghetto off, action against workers exploitation in agriculture	Strategy against exploitation. Until March 2017, the main settlement existing in the province of Foggia was known with the name "Large Ghetto" built in the 90ies (up to 2.500 people in summer). the Region put in place a comprehensive strategy against the exploitation of workers employed in agriculture A Task Force was established, coordinated by the Puglia Region. It decided the dismantling of the "Large Ghetto" within summer 2014 and to replace it with <i>"a plan for a widespread reception of the resident migrant workers and a distributed network of areas equipped for the widespread accommodation of seasonal migrants"</i> .	2016 - subscription of the Experimental Protocol against the "Caporalato" and labor exploitation in agriculture "Care - Legality - Exit from the Ghetto". March 2017: the "humanitarian evacuation" of the "Large Ghetto" and elaboration of an action plan. 150 migrant workers were welcomed at the regional farm "Fortore" in San Severo, which is currently managed by the Association "Ghetto Out-Home Sankara" (80 migrant workers are living there)
<b>PUGLIA REGION, ITALY</b> <b>Puglia Region. Association of immigrants "Ghetto Out-Home Sankara"</b>	Regional farm "Fortore"	testing new practices of social and work inclusion and to face the housing emergency of migrant workers in the province of Foggia. The farm "Fortore" is a project born on the basis of the synergy existing between the Institutions and the Third sector.	Promoting an agriculture with a lower environmental but higher social impact (as organic farming). The agricultural company "Fortore" houses about 200 people, including some families with children (attending schools), that come from the difficult life experience within the "Large Ghetto".



Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>THURINGIA Lander, GERMANY</b> <b>Caritas association Thüringen</b>	Refugees integration support	Refugees integration. the diocese Erfurt is an important actor which deals with the coordination of volunteers in the refugee aid., they support migrants in different areas as: accompany them to different offices, leisure activities, learn the language, etc. Furthermore, the Caritas offers immigration counselling for adult migrants, return counselling, and psychosocial counselling.	
<b>THURINGIA Lander, GERMANY</b> <b>Iberoamérica Thüringen</b>	Migrants as Actors in the Integration and Political Education Work	Empower migrants. They offer continuing education events are offered to improve the work of migrant organisations. They also promote the collaboration of migrant organisations, refugee initiatives, and free social agencies by means of regular meetings within the MigraNetz Thüringen.	
<b>THURINGIA Lander, GERMANY</b> <b>Thuringian Lander</b>	Think Colourful	Promotion of diversity. It puts a focus on the aspects handling of right-wing extremism and group-focused enmity, strengthening of democracy, and tolerance, remembrance work, intercultural opening and intercultural and international learning.	
<b>THURINGIA Lander, GERMANY</b> <b>Centre for Integration and Migration</b>	Website Integration and Migration in Thuringia	The website is available in German, English and Russian. The aim is to support the process of integration by showing the different offers and possibilities for migrants, refugees, citizens, and involved players. People can find contact persons, the addresses of offices and authorities, and they can get information about different projects.	Improve information, present different actors and activities.
<b>NORDHAUSEN, GERMANY</b> <b>JugendSozialwerk Nordhausen</b>	Nordhausen Helps! Sito web	The website provides information for local citizens, migrants, and refugees in English and German. The different offers include: language courses, workshops, meeting rooms, contact points, etc. Furthermore, people who want to offer help get inspiration and information about existing activities. In addition, a variety of leisure activities, offers of work, and employment are shown. In order to give them orientation in Nordhausen, an interactive city map is added on the website where people can choose between different categories.	Improve information, present different actors and activities.

Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>THURINGIA Lander, GERMANY</b> <b>Civil Society and Local Authorities</b> <b>Berufsbildungszentrum Nordhausen gGmbH;</b> <b>University of Applied Sciences; BVU GmbH Nordhausen;</b> <b>Institut für Bildung und Sicherheit; Computer-Schulung &amp; Consulting; Deutsche Angestellten-Akademie GmbH;</b> <b>Kreisvolkshochschule Nordhausen</b>	Support integration	A multiplicity of actors are providing integration courses. These providers offer integration courses with different focuses, e.g. literacy or work-related. The courses give the participants orientation and support in learning the language, education, training, consulting, Adult Education. Furthermore, migration advice for adult immigrants is offered. The aim is to manage and accompany the integration of immigrated people. People with a migration background who are younger than 27 years old get advised by youth migration services. Their aim is to support migrants in social, educational, and occupational integration. In addition, several projects and other activities that work on the integration of immigrants got supported by the federation.	
<b>THURINGIA Lander, GERMANY</b> <b>State districts and cities in Thuringia</b>	Thuringian Initiative for Local Integration Management in the Communes	It supports the districts and cities in Thuringia with the establishment of integration management. The state government finances municipal integration managers who analyse existing and necessary local structures to identify local challenges to achieve a successful integration.	Development of a local integration concepts and support regional networks
<b>MOSTAR, BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA</b> <b>Supported by UNICEF, and operated by NGO Žene sa Une (ŽsU), StC, SOS Children's Villages, and World Vision</b>	Child Friendly Spaces (CFS)	Operate at the Salakovac RRC. In March 2019, 82 children benefited from CFS services at the Salakovac RRC (48 girls, 34 boys)	82 children benefited
<b>MOSTAR, BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA</b> <b>Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and ECHO</b>	Healthcare for refugees and migrant Stari Grad Mostar PHC in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton	Provides healthcare for refugees and migrants who are registered in the Salakovac RRC (as of 1 March 2019), primary healthcare is provided on-site through the engagement of medical teams from local Health Care Providers (PHC). Specialized services on the primary level (including laboratory analysis, gynecological, pediatric and other services).	

Location and Actor/s	Practice	Dimension	Achievements
<b>MOSTAR, BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA</b> <b>UNICEF, and operated by ŽsU, StC, SOS Children's Villages, and World Vision</b>	Mother Baby Corners (MBC) Salakovac RRC	At the Salakovac RRC, provide parents with IYCF (Infant and Young Child Feeding)) counselling, information/ awareness raising on breastfeeding and hygiene, psychosocial counselling, and support the provision of infant food and hygiene products.	In March 2019, 11 mothers and 13 children at the Salakovac RRC (8 girls, 5 boys) benefitted from MBC
<b>MOSTAR, BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA</b> <b>Salakovac RRC, BHVI, supported by UNHCR</b>	Sport and educational activities "My School"	A range of activities, including separate Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and English lessons for women and men three times per week (attended by five women and ten men), Childcare services are provided during the aforementioned activities as needed. In lieu, of approval from the Cantonal Ministry of Education for refugee and migrant children to attend school, "My School", a custom education program continued in March 2019 in the Salakovac RRC	Knitting workshops three times a week (attended by 13 women), sewing workshops three times a week (attended by 10 women), women's aerobics three times a week (attended by 10 women), and sports and recreational activities two times a week (attended by 17 adults and 30 children)





Snapshots From The Borders is a 3-year project co-funded by the European Union (EuropeAid DEAR budget line), run by 35 partners, border Local Authorities and Civil Society organisations. Snapshots From The Borders aims to improve the critical understanding of European, national and local decision makers and of public opinion about **global interdependencies determining migration flows towards European borders**, in the perspective of reaching SDGs targets, especially SDG 1, 5, 10 11 and 16. Specifically, the project intends to strengthen a new horizontal, active **network among cities directly facing migration flows at EU borders**, as a way to promote more effective policy coherence at all levels (European, national, local). By letting the voice of the real protagonist traveling from the 20 territories of the project throughout Europe among European citizens, from the periphery to the center at National and European level to show how **migration is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon and a political issue which needs efforts and concrete actions taken by people and organization/network at all level of society.**

[www.snapshotsfromtheborders.eu](http://www.snapshotsfromtheborders.eu)

*The photos used in this publication are taken from the Project Activities' database.*





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